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UNNATURAL ACTS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO PRIVACY: A MORAL THEORY
DAVID A. J. RICHARDS*
T HE relationship of moral and legal ideas in constitutional law is
currently undergoing a striking and suggestive theoretical re-
examination. In contradistinction to Learned Hand's influential legal
positivist indictment of the use of "natural law" in constitutional
interpretation,' recent commentary urges "the strength of our natural
law inheritance in constitutional adjudication [which it is] unwise as
well as hopeless to resist."'2 This re-examination of natural law think-
ing could point the way toward a needed "fusion of constitutional law
and moral theory, a connection that, incredibly, has yet to take place,
[and without which] [c]onstitutional law can make no genuine ad-
vance." 3 Obviously, the relationship between morality and constitu-
tional law is not exact.4 Nonetheless, a number of provisions of the
Constitution presuppose strong moral ideas, the analysis of which
fundamentally clarifies constitutional interpretation.-'
This Article will attempt to show how moral theory may elucidate
constitutional adjudication by focusing on the question of whether the
private performance of "unnatural" sexual acts by consenting adults is
protected by the constitutional right to privacy-an issue strikingly
* Member of the New York Bar. Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of
Law. Professor Richards received an A.B. from Harvard College, a D.Phil. from Oxford
University, and a J.D. from Harvard Law School. The author thanks Diana R. Lewis, second
year student at Fordham University School of Law, for her fine research assistance in writing this
paper, and acknowledges deep gratitude to the gracious, generous, and stimulating assistance of
Donald Levy, of the Brooklyn College Philosophy Department, who actively assisted his research
and helped the author to develop the themes of this paper, including, in crucial part, Donald
Levy's own contributions to the theory of the unnatural.
1. See L. Hand, The Bill of Rights 1-3 (1958) (hereinafter cited as Hand] which eschews the
usefulness of moral ideas in understanding constitutional law and adopts instead the interpreta-
tion of the will of the constitutional founders. Cf. id. at 73 (Hand's indictment of the role of the
Court as "Platonic Guardians").
2. A. Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government 113 (1976)
3. Dworkin, The Jurisprudence of Richard Nixon, N.Y. Rev. of Books, May 4, 1972 at 27,
35. See also Dworkin, Legal Research, 102 Daedalus 53, 63 (1973).
4. See Richards, Equal Opportunity and School Financing: Towards a Moral Theory of
Constitutional Adjudication, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 32, 32-33, 39-41 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Equal
Opportunity].
5. See id. at 32 nn. 1-4; Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of
the First Amendment, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Free Speech). These
themes are developed in more extensive form in Richards, The Moral Criticism of Law 25-103
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Moral Criticism]. This Article is a development and elaboration of a
shorter and more summary discussion appearing in Moral Criticism, supra.
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raised by the Supreme Court's recent summary affirmance in Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney for City of Richmond.6 This decision dra-
matically raises the question of the relationship between moral ideas
and constitutional adjudication, for it concerns the implications of, and
limits upon, the constitutional right to privacy-a right alleged from its
inception to rest on the moral conceptions of natural law. 7
Morally informed constitutional provisions have not always been
applied uniformly and consistently with their underlying moral princi-
ples. For example, the first amendment clearly rests on the substantive
moral idea that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain
basic human rights. This idea was familiar to educated men at the
time of the Constitution's promulgation8 and is generally regarded as
being among the fundamental moral assumptions of the founding
fathers. The Constitution did not, however, consistently extend these
basic rights to all persons. For example, the institution of slavery was
nowhere condemned, but was rather impliedly endorsed. 9 This flaw in
the constitutional charter of basic moral rights was resolved only by
the Civil War and the constitutional amendments which followed in its
wake. 10 Of these amendments, the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment have been especially fertile
sources for the enlargement of constitutional rights. The equal protec-
tion clause, for example, has been interpreted to require forms of equal
treatment well beyond the original intent to abolish slavery and
6. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g without opinion 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge
court).
7. Thus, Justice Black complained in his dissent from Griswold v. Connecticut that the
majority opinion was "natural justice" in disguise. 381 U.S. 479, 511-12 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting). See Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right to Privacy, 1966 Wis. L.
Rev. 979, 982 (referring to Douglas' opinion as an exercise in "modified 'natural law' ").
8. See, e.g., J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (T. Peardon ed. 1952); J. Locke,
A Letter Concerning Toleration, in Treatise of Civil Government and A Letter Concerning
Toleration (C. Sherman ed. 1937); J. Milton, Areopagitica, in Areopagitica and Of Education (G.
Sabine ed. 1951); J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, in The Social Contract and Discourses (G.
Cole trans. 1930). See also I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice (J. Ladd trans. 1965),
I. Kant, Concerning the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, But Does Not Apply in
Practice, in Society, Law, and Morality 159-72 (F. Olafson ed. 1961).
9. Three clauses in the Constitution refer to slaves in a way that contemplates the continued
existence of the institution of slavery, though in each case a circumlocution is used, not the word
"slave" or a variant thereof. The Slave Trade Clause provides: "The Migration or Importation of
such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited
by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may
be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person." U.S. Const. art. I, §
9, cl. 1. See also id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("three-fifths of all other Persons") and art. I, § 2, cl. 3
("Person held to Service or Labour").
10. Id. amend. XIII (adopted 1865); id. amend. XIV (adopted 1868); id. amend. XV (adopted
1870).
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concommitant state practices.11 The due process clause has been
interpreted to require not only the application of many of the original
amendments comprising the Bill of Rights to the states, but has also
been viewed as a means of protecting basic liberties not expressly
articulated in the Bill of Rights. 12
This gradual expansion of constitutionally protected moral rights,
whether by amendment or judicial decision, typically rests on constitu-
tional provisions strikingly general in form (e.g., "freedom of speech or
of the press"; "due process of law"; "equal protection of the law") and
often lacking any convincing legal history regarding the intended
application of the provision. A consensus, to the extent one existed
when these clauses were drafted, was reached on the generalities of a
political compromise which concealed future divergences in interpreta-
tion of these moral rights. 13 Even when circumstances at that time
strongly suggest that a certain interpretation of a constitutional provi-
sion was not contemplated, such legal history has not been found
determinative by the Supreme Court. 14
The Supreme Court has the germinal role in the development of
constitutional doctrine. Given the generality of constitutional provi-
sions bearing on basic rights, the typically ambiguous legal history,
11. An excellent account of this development is presented in Developments in the Law-
Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065 (1969). See J. James, The Framing of the Fourteenth
Amendment (1956); H. Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 210-77 (1908); J.
tenBroek, Equal Under Law (1956); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of -Equal
Protection of the Laws," 50 Colum. L. Rev. 131 (1950).
12. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of married couples to use
contraceptives); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (the right to educate a child in a
school of the parents' choice); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (the right of a child to
study a foreign language).
13. The legal history of free speech, for example, in England and America prior to the
adoption of the first amendment obviously renders doubtful any consensus on the specific
application of the amendment. See generally L. Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech
and Press in Early American History (1960) [hereinafter cited as Levy].
14. For example, the adopters of the fourteenth amendment quite dearly did not contemplate
that the amendment would abolish segregation. See Bickel, The Original Understanding and th
Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1955). Yet, the Court in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 489 (1954) expressly put such history aside in reaching its decision.
Similarly, the existence at the time of the adoption of the first amendment of laws, such as
those against seditious libel, has never been supposed to conclude the question of the constitu-
tionality of such laws. For a discussion of the crime of seditious libel at common law, see Levy,
supra note 13. For the view that seditious libel was abolished by the first amendment, see
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 272 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,
264-65 (1941); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 248-49 (1936) (first amendment
prohibits taxes that restrict newspaper circulation, although such taxes were employed in
England and America at the time of that amendment's adoption).
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and the ultimately independent Supreme Court decisional authority for
the development of constitutional doctrine, the idea that shared fun-
damental moral values underlie these basic rights may explain both the
function of constitutional adjudication in this area as a limitation on
majoritarian power and the progressive evolution of specific constitu-
tional rights. 15 This underlying philosophy is known as contractarian
moral theory and its importance to a thorough understanding of
constitutional rights can hardly be overestimated. Whatever its ade-
quacy as a general moral theory, failure to take seriously the contribu-
tion of contractarian thought to constitutional law is a failure to
appreciate the significance of contractarian ideas in the minds of those
who established the constitutional order.' 6
The use of contractarian theory in understanding constitutional law
has been superficially analogized to the attempt to incorporate ideolog-
ical economic views into constitutional mandates. 17 But contractarian
theory does not beckon as a theoretical desideratum extraneous to the
constitutional order; it is at its foundation. When the founding fathers
adopted a Bill of Rights intended to render certain rights immune from
abridgement by legislative majorities, they echoed a contractarian line
of thought familiar to them in the work of Locke and developed as
well by other philosophers. 18 Later amendments to the Constitution,
notably the fourteenth amendment, represent a natural extension of
this general contractarian conception. Most constitutional theorists
acknowledge the influence of contractarian thought but this acknowl-
edgement is often followed by either frank disavowal of such ideas 9 or
the invocation of explanatory theories lacking the focal historic sig-
15. This proposition is a variation on a theme elsewhere defended. See sources cited in note 5
supra.
16. For works illustrative of the influence of social contractarian thought on American con-
stitutionalism, see R. Adams, Political Ideas of the American Revolution 26 (1959); L. Haute,
John Locke and the Liberal Consensus, in The Role of Ideology in the American Revolution 51
(1970); G. Wood, The Creation of the American Revolution: 1776-1787 at 282-305 (1969); note 8
supra. In addition, for a review of relevant historical materials indicating the connections of
natural rights theory and American constitutionalism, see Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals,
and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
689, 695-707 (1976); see also B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
(1967); H. May, The Enlightenment in America (1976); Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial
Review: The Evolution of Constitutional Theory in the States, 1790-1860, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1166 (1972).
17. "The Fourteenth Amendment, as Holmes has said, does 'not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics.' Nor does it enact Mr. John Rawls's A Theory of Justice." Wellington, Common
Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 Yale L.J. 22 1,
279-80, 285 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Wellington].
18. See notes 8 & 16 supra.
19. See, e.g., Hand, supra note 1, at 1-3, 33-34.
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nificance of contractarian theory. 20 The consequence has been con-
stitutional theories which either sharply limit judicial review on con-
stitutional grounds 21 or skeptically undermine in principle the very
idea of judicial review of majoritarian laws or policies.2 2 Having
dissolved in cynical acid the moral ideas intrinsic to the constitutional
order, 23 unsurprisingly the theorists find that order difficult to justify
or defend. Contractarian theory remedies these defects. By building on
the moral conceptions historically underlying the constitutional order,
this theory takes moral ideas seriously in a way in which other
constitutional theories do not. Perhaps contractarian theory is not the
final word as a comprehensive moral theory.24 Nonetheless, it is
unquestionably the moral foundation of the Constitution and, as such,
requires the most serious and sustained consideration.
The examination of the constitutional right to privacy in its applica-
tion to "unnatural" sex acts is an important test for the adequacy of
this contractarian approach. From its inception, the constitutional
right to privacy, whether derived as an implication of various amend-
ments in the Bill of Rights, 25 as a substantive right required by due
process of law,26 or as a right reserved to the people by the ninth
amendment, 27 has been supposed to rest on moral ideas. Yet, the
explanation of these moral ideas and their relationship to constitutional
rights has been notoriously undeveloped, resulting in the not uncom-
mon misapprehension that the right to privacy cases rest on legislative
policy, not underlying moral principles.28 The summary affirmance in
20. See A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 1-30 (1975); Wellington, supra note 17, at 279-S0,
285.
21. See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893) [hereinafter cited as Thayer].
22. Hand, supra note 1. Cf. A. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress (1970) in
which a value skepticism similar to Hand's leads to a critique of the idea of moral reform through
constitutional adjudication. Moral reflection and reform in the light of principles is to be replaced
by unconscious moral historicism. See id. at 174-75. These ideas represent a significant retreat
from his earlier work. See A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Least Dangerous].
23. See Hand, supra note 1, at 1-3, 33-34. The famous appeal to wash the law in Cynical acid
derives from 0. Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 167-202 (1952)
24. For an attempt to develop it into a general moral theory, see Richards, A Theory of
Reasons for Action (1971) [hereinafter cited as Action].
25. Thus, Justice Douglas inferred the constitutional right to privacy as being in the
"penumbra" formed by emanations of specific constitutional guarantees. Griswold v, Connec-
ticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
26. See id. at 499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U S. 497. 539-55
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
27. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965) (Goldberg. J.. concurring).
28. See generally Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J.
920 (1973); Comment, Roe v. Wade-The Abortion Decision-An Analysis and Its Implication,
1977] RIGHT TO PRIVACY 1285
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Doe, which could be read as excluding "unnatural" sex acts from the
scope of the right to privacy, may give compelling force to this
misconception. Without delivering any opinion, the Court may have
summarily limited the right to privacy in a way that suggests fiat, not
articulated principle. It is important to know whether the Court's view
is fundamentally consistent with the moral theory underlying the right
to privacy.
This examination of the moral underpinnings of the constitutional
right to privacy also bears on broader issues in criminal law theory and
practice regarding the decriminalization of so-called victimless
crimes. 29 It has been convincingly argued that the employment of law
enforcement resources in the pursuit of victimless crimes is wasteful
given the special costs of enforcement in this area and the marginal
gains in conformity to law.3 0 The argument is made that these
resources could be more effectively employed against more serious
crimes (i.e., crimes of violence). These arguments, while undoubtedly
significant, and perhaps decisive, depend on the premise that some of
these acts are either less worthy of punishment than other offenses or
not properly punishable at all. But little significant theoretical atten-
tion has been given to the question of whether these acts, or certain of
them, may not be properly punishable. 3 1 At bottom, the argument
probably depends for its force on a moral analysis of why it may be
affirmatively wrong to use the criminal law to punish at least certain of
these acts. At this point, there is a useful convergence between the
theoretical aims of constitutional and criminal law theory. If we can
articulate the moral argument against the use of the criminal law to
punish certain of these acts (e.g., private consensual sex acts between
adults), we may at the same time have explained and clarified the
constitutional considerations which should immunize these acts from
criminal penalty.3 2
10 San Diego L. Rev. 844, 848-51 (1973); Note, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton: The Compelling
State Interest Test in Substantive Due Process, 30 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 628, 634-35, 642-43
(1973).
29. Examples of illegal conduct sometimes described as "victimless crimes" are drug and
alcohol abuse, gambling and prostitution. See N. Morris & G. Hawkins, The Honest Politician's
Guide to Crime Control 4 (1970); H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 266 (1968);
Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 Annals 157, 159 (1967). See also Model Penal
Code, §§ 207.1-.6 Comments (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); see sources cited in note 297 infra.
30. See sources cited in note 29 supra.
31. For a criticism of the decriminalization literature for its failure to face fundamental moral
issues, see Junker, Criminalization and Criminogenesis, 19 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 697 (197,2). See
also, Kadish, More on Overcriminalization: A Reply to Professor Junker, 19 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
719 (1972).
32. If this can be accomplished, it may then be possible to assess whether or to what extent
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We shall examine, then, the constitutional right to privacy in its
application to "unnatural" sex acts as part of the general problem in
moral theory of the just employment of the criminal law. Put differ-
ently, we are inquiring into the proper scope of the police power, the
traditional ground upon which the substantive criminal law has been
predicated. In particular, we focus here on the uncritical invocation of
the concept of the unnatural as a proper ground for the exercise of the
police power in prohibiting certain private, consensual sex acts. A
necessary preliminary step, however, is to examine the very notion of
the unnatural.
I. THE CONCEPT OF THE UNNATURAL
In giving an account of the unnatural, 33 one wishes to clarify the
concept itself, point out its connections to related ideas, and shed some
light on the emotionally charged attitudes which the notion of "un-
natural acts" often evokes in our society. Initally, we will describe
some general marks of the unnatural. Then, a fuller explication of the
notion will be proposed and, finally, its application to sexual deviance
will be examined.
1. The Marks of the Unnatural
The word "unnatural" derives as an adjectival negative of the Latin
natura, meaning "sort," "kind," "quality," or "character."3 4 Natura,
and by implication the English word "nature," and related forms, were
in turn shaped by the Greek phusis, meaning "kind," "character," or
"description. 3 5 Aristotle, for example, defined phusis thus: "[Wlhat
each thing is when its growth is complete.1 36
But, just as the involuntary is not equivalent to the not v'oluntary, 37
the unnatural is not equivalent to the not natural. We would say of
many things that they were not natural Without supposing that they
were therefore unnatural. A coroner thus certifies that the death of a
person in an unfortunate automobile accident is not from natural
similar considerations apply to other victimless crimes. Surely, there are significant differences
between adult consensual sex acts in private and commercialized prostitution and narcotics
peddling. No significant advance will be made, in either criminal law theory or practice, until the
differences and similarities are carefully and systematically scrutinized in the light of both moral
theory and empirical evidence.
33. For an account of criteria of theoretical adequacy, see Action. supra note 24. at 3-10.
34. See C. S. Lewis, Studies in Words 24-74 (1960).
35. See id. at 33-42.
36. Aristotle, Politics 1252b.




causes; we do not therefore conclude that the death is unnatural.38 A
man may not speak naturally (he is, say, tired or emotionally over-
wrought), but we may be very clear that he is not speaking unnaturally
(as we might suppose if we heard schizophrenic word salads). The
unnatural is clearly at least not natural; but it is also much more.
A careful reading of the several dictionary definitions of "unnatural"
reveals this core meaning: "[N]ot determined by or consistent with a
normal course of events . . . ARTIFICIAL . . . STRANGE . . . not
innately characteristic of the nature of man . . . not being in accor-
dance with normal feelings or behavior: PERVERSE, ABNOR-
MAL." '39 The suggestion is that the unnatural involves a tampering
with that which, left alone, achieves a certain characteristic form.
In general, action is characterized as unnatural only when it repre-
sents a departure to that which is thought to be worse. When people
widely believed in miraculous cures, they regarded them as not
natural, but not unnatural, since these inexplicably miraculous events
supplied a human good-that of relieving suffering. Supernatural
grace, for those who believe in it, is not natural, but not unnatural
either. The supernaturally evil is alone the unnatural-the satanic, or
demonic.
"Unnatural" clearly is not only significantly applied to questions of
the morality of human acts. We speak, for example, of an unnatural
tone of voice, or an unnatural use of words, as well as of unnatural
rock formations or trees or sunsets. Nonetheless, the term "unnatural"
is often used to characterize some feature of the immorality of human
acts.
Some examples of human actions which have traditionally been
considered unnatural are violent acts toward members of one's imme-
diate family (e.g., patricide, matricide and childbeating), regicide,
incestuous acts, and sexual acts other than heterosexual copulation.
Thus, in Hamlet, for example, the king's ghost says that while all
murder is "most foul," his own murder was "strange and unnatural. '40
38. The notion of an unnatural death suggests a special kind of death not from natural
causes, for example, a son murdering his mother. Such examples are common in Shakespeare.
See notes 40 & 41 infra and accompanying text.
39. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2504 (1964).
40. W. Shakespeare, Hamlet, act I, scene v (regicide, fratricide); note also Hamlet's remark
when he contemplates the possibility of killing his mother: "Let me be cruel, not unnatural: I will
speak daggers to her, but use none .... Id., act III, scene ii. See also the Orestes legend and tile
Greek tragedies built thereupon: Agamemnon-Iphigenia (father kills daughter); Clytemnestra-
Agamemnon (wife kills husband); Orestes-Clytemnestra (son kills mother). Similarly, a treacher-
ous man, like Edmund in King Lear, may do one good deed which is a departure from his
supposed nature. Because the departure from Edmund's nature is good, we feel no temptation to
1288 [Vol. 45
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In similar spirit, Lady Macbeth, girding herself for murder, must ward
off the "compunctious visitings of nature."'
As a matter of methodology, one may, of course, den), that this
notion of the "unnatural" is either sensibly coherent, 42 or reflects
defensible modern scientific ideas. 43 However, rather than questioning
the intelligibility or acceptability of the idea of the unnatural itself, we
shall attempt to show that the notion has a certain determinate
content.
2. An Explication of the Unnatural
The term "unnatural" is an incomplete one, depending for its sense
on the kind of things to which it is being applied (for example, persons,
acts, events, etc.). The idea underlying the expression is intrinsically
theoretical. The particular sense in which the term unnatural is meant
derives from notions of the proper functioning of the kind of thing to
which it is to be applied. Thus, in ordinary life we develop theories of
how things operate and function, on the basis of which we make
predictions and develop expectations. The unnatural, as a concept,
expresses the idea that the operation of a thing, as explained by the
theory we have of how that kind of thing operates, has gone awry-
has been impaired, frustrated or corrupted-so that we have difficulty
even in understanding how a thing of that kind can operate in this
way.
Thus, since we have such theories of natural events, we apply the
term unnatural to such events when they deviate from the theory in an
impairing way (for example, unnaturally cold weather). As applied to
human beings and their acts, the unnatural necessarily rests on a
theoretical conception of proper human functioning, deviation from
which impairs, frustrates, corrupts, or degrades. Thus, the unnatural,
as applied to human acts, is not the same idea as the irregular or
statistically abnormal. If an unnatural act like matricide were prac-
ticed more regularly, we would nonetheless regard it as unnatural so
long as we regarded it as a deviation from proper human function-
ing.44 Through this notion of a uniquely human nature, man is
characterize his conduct as unnatural except in an ironic sense. W. Shakespeare. King Lear, act
V, scene iii.
41. W. Shakespeare, Macbeth, act I, scene v (regicide).
42. See, e.g., J. Mill, Nature, in The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill 445-88 (1961), Slate.
Inapplicable Concepts and Sexual Perversion, in Philosophy and Sex 261-67 (R. Baker & F,
Elliston eds. 1975).
43. See sources cited in note 42 supra. See also M. Hoffman, The Gay World ch. 6 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Hoffman].
44. The unnatural, resting on notions of characteristic human functioning, has many similari-
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distinguished from other creatures. Certain experiences-for exam-
ple, abiding personal affection and commitment-are seen as both
unique to man and central to full self-realization. 45 On this view,
human beings act unnaturally when they act in ways which deprive
themselves or others of such experiences-for example, when a parent
willfully deprives his child of affection. Such an action stretches the
notion of human nature to the breaking point and appears to be
inexplicable.
To the extent that differing theories of human nature may identify
different human capacities, propensities and ends as central, slightly
differing conceptions of the unnatural will result. Shakespeare, for
example, clearly believed that rule by an anointed hereditary monarch
was a primary human good without which society could not achieve
minimal conditions of order.46 So supposing, Shakespeare under-
standably regarded usurpation of the hereditary monarch's power and,
ties to the concept of the obscene. An obscene depiction of a human function is one which
portrays an unnatural, abusive use of that function and thus is offensive to people's sense of
bodily competence. See Free Speech, supra note 5, at 48. Acts regarded as unnatural conse-
quently are often regarded as obscene on the ground that they are unnatural. Obscene depictions,
of course, are not only of unnatural acts. Normal heterosexual intercourse between a married
couple is not typically viewed as obscene; but a public depiction of such intercourse would, by
some people, be viewed as obscene. Nonetheless, the alleged unnaturalness of an act is often a
sufficient condition for the obscenity of a depiction of that act. At one time obscenity convictions
were granted for the mere sympathetic discussion of homosexuality or advocacy of birth control
or abortion, apart from any pornographic representation of any kind. See H. Hyde, A History of
Pornography 2-8 (1964); N. St. John-Stevas, Obscenity and the Law 70.74, 98-103 (1956). Note
also the text of the substantive section of the Comstock Act which prohibits the mailing, inter
alia, of any thing "designed ... for producing abortion." Comstock Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970).
See also United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093 (No. 14,571) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879); Regina v.
Bradlaugh, 2 Q.B.D. 569 (1877), rev'd on other grounds, 3 Q.B.D. 607 (1878). The idea seems to
have been that, since homosexuality, birth control and abortion were obscene, any favorable
discussion of them would also be obscene. Even today, courts are quickest to make or affirm
judgements of obscenity with respect to depictions of sexual acts such as cunnilingus, fellatio,
sodomy, sado-masochism and bestiality. Compare, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 52 (1973) (Burger, C.J., emphasized the occurrence of "scenes of simulated fellatio,
cunnilingus, and group sex intercourse") and Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966)
(depictions of flagellation, fetishism, and lesbianism held obscene) with Sunshine Book Co. v
Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958) (per curiam), rev'g 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957), aff'g 128 F.
Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1955) (nudity per se not obscene). Cf. R. Kuh, Foolish Figleaves? 306-07
(1967) (suggesting that the depiction of bestiality and homosexuality are more obscene than
comparable depictions of heterosexual activity). The view that these acts are unnatural is the
basis for judging their depiction to be obscene.
45. For one theory setting out such general human goods, see notes 133-169 infra and
accompanying text.
46. See, for example, Ulysses' great speech of order. W. Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida,
act I, scene iii.
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of course, regicide as unnatural, 47 for such acts frustrate human
purposes and terminate the minimal conditions that make life in
society possible. Other theories of human nature, not identifying
monarchy as a primary human good, would not regard comparable
acts as unnatural, however otherwise immoral or undesirable.
In general, theories of human nature typically do not regard im-
moral acts as necessarily unnatural, for many forms of immorality are
all too characteristically human. In murdering, for example, people
often act on quite understandable human motives of jealousy, anger,
venality, and the like. Such murders are morally wrong, but not
unnatural; while the ends achieved by the murders do not morally
justify the means chosen, we can understand how humans come to
make such trade-offs. Only those murders are judged unnatural which
achieve ends which are insignificant compared to the human goods
sacrificed. Thus, intrafamilial murders are commonly regarded as
unnatural48 on the ground that such murders inexplicably sacrifice the
primary human good of warm familial attachments for inhumanly
paltry reasons. Theft, similarly, is morally wrong, but unnatural only
in a case such as a robbery committed by a millionaire simply "for
kicks." Traditionally, the performance of such acts was thought by
simple people of good will to distinguish the human from the inhuman
and either degrade the perpetrator into an animal or demon 49 or
elevate him into a god.50 If one supposed that the only proper purpose
of human sexuality is procreations' it would follow that while fornica-
tion may be immoral it is not unnatural since the procreative purpose
is not violated, whereas bestiality and homosexuality are both immoral
and unnatural.
Perversion is a subcategory of the unnatural in that a defining mark
of the perverted is the employment of human functions in such a way
as intentionally to deprive oneself or others of the capacity to use those
47. Of the mere deed of a subject's judging his king, Shakespeare wrote: "0, forfend it, God,
that in a Christian climate, souls refin'd should show so heinous, black, obscene a deed!" W.
Shakespeare, Richard II, act IV, scene i.
48. See notes 39-43 supra and accompanying text.
49. See, for example, Shakespeare's pervasive animal imagery in King Lear in his description
of the "unnatural hags," Goneril and Regan. W. Shakespeare, King Lear. act II, scene iv. Note
also Kant's attempt to view the choice between good and evil as a choice among several
natures---the demonic, the animal and the human. I. Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone 15-49 (T. Greene & H. Hudson trans. 1960).
50. Note the conclusion of Euripides' Medea. After the unnatural murder of her two children,
she appears to Jason as a kind of divinity. Jason refers to her as "A monstr, not a woman,"
Euripides, Four Tragedies 104 (D. Grene & R. Lattimore eds. 1955), and "Woman, this monster,
murderess of children." Id. at 108.
51. See notes 68-72 infra and accompanying text.
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functions to secure greater rational pleasure or satisfaction.5 2 Further,
perversion involves unnatural employment of function for the motive
of pleasure-taking pleasure in acting unnaturally. Perverted acts are
distinguishable from both heterosexual sodomitical acts and from
homosexual acts in that they cannot involve the expression of love
between consenting partners.5 3 For example, forms of exclusive sexual
fetishism are sexual perversions because in such cases a person takes
pleasure in forms of sexuality which cut him off from more satisfying
forms of human and sexual intercourse.5 4
3. The Unnatural and Sexual Deviance
Homosexuality, one significant form of sexual deviance,"5 may be
defined as sexual intercourse between partners of the same sex, divid-
52. These points are developed at greater and more convincing length in an unpublished
paper. Levy, Unnatural Acts and Sexual Perversions (on file at Fordham Law Review). For a
recent psychoanalytic treatment, see H. Stoller, Perversion: The Erotic Form of Hatred (1975).
The main alternative philosophical accounts are Slote, Inapplicable Concepts and Sexual Perver-
sion, in Philosophy and Sex 261-67 (R. Baker & F. Elliston eds. 1975); Nagel, Sexual Perversion,
66 J. Philosophy 5 (1969); and Solomon, Sexual Paradigms, 71 J. Philosophy 336 (1974) For a
conventional psychoanalytic treatment, see Perversions, Psychodynamics and Therapy (S. Lorand
ed. 1956).
53. See Levy, Unnatural Acts and Sexual Perversions 2, 3, 10, 11 (on file at Fordham Law
Review); Solomon, Sexual Paradigms, 71 J. Philosophy 336 (1974). But see R. Stoller, Perversion:
The Erotic Form of Hatred 195-206 (1975), where a psychoanalyist suggests that the homosexual
lifestyle is essentially perverted in that it involves the willful rejection of heterosexual family life.
"Every child knows that he is the product of an inevitably heterosexual act that is intimate,
exciting, mysterious, astonishing, profound, dangerous, forbidden, and terribly desirable; and
every family--even those whose failure produces severe disorder in the child immersed in
it-unendingly blankets its offspring with messages that the ideal would be a heterosexual family.
.. . This is so not because it is ordained so by heaven, biology, or economic theory but because
almost all members of our society accept it somewhere within themselves as the ideal that haunts
them." Id. at 204.
This notion appears to be a somewhat romanticized restatement of the now largely repudiated
view in psychiatry that homosexuality is a form of disease. See note 242 infra. It is surely
dogmatic to suppose that children always perceive heterosexual family life in this favorable way,
Indeed, if there is any truth in the psychoanalytic model of the aetiology of homosexuality as
involving a domineering, controlling mother and a detached father, it is implausible that
homosexuals would always perceive their past family experience as ideal, or even desirable. See
note 245 infra. Marriage may be heaven, but it is surely sometimes also hell. See, e.g., R. Laing
& A. Esterson, Sanity, Madness and the Family (1964).
54. The perverted should be distinguished from the merely perverse. Perverse acts, like
perverted acts, involve the taking of pleasure in forms of evil, but the evil is not of an unnatural
kind or degree. One's host may wreck a social evening by bringing up business matters of the
previous day known to be annoying to you; his pleasure in doing so makes him a bad host and a
perverse person, but hardly perverted.
55. Sexual deviance also includes forms of heterosexual sex, such as heterosexual fellatio,
cunnilingus and sodomy. Statutes also condemn both heterosexual and homosexual forms of
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ing into its female form (lesbianism) and its male form. Homosexuality
must be distinguished from pederasty or pedophilia. Pederasty is
sexual intercourse between an older man and a young boy. Homosexu-
ality is not so limited, hoxikever. In general, it occurs between same-
sexed partners, both above the age of majority. 56
As has been noted, homosexuality has traditionally been considered
to be an "unnatural act."'5 7 It will be argued, however, that there is no
necessary conceptual connection between homosexuality and the
unnatural-that sexual relations between same-sexed partners is not
necessarily a damaging impairment of proper function.-8 But first it
will be necessary to examine how homosexuality came historically to
be regarded as unnatural.
The earliest literate explanation of the association of the unnatural
and sexual deviance appears in Plato's Laws.59 Plato argued that male
homosexual acts are unnatural on two grounds. First, such acts
undermine the development of desirable masculine character traits--
for example, courage and self-control. This idea probably rested on the
assumption that homosexual acts degrade men to the status of
sexual deviance, with an exception for married couples. See, e.g.. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 130.00(Z),
130.38 (McKinney 1975). The idea of sexual deviance is dearly a normative, not a statistical one.
Heterosexual forms of sexual deviance are now among the recipe of sexual responses listed by
popular sex manuals. See, e.g., The joy of Sex 129-32, 150, 152-64 (A. Comfort ed. 1972)- The
data of the Kinsey report on male homosexuality, derived from a more sexually conservative era,
shows that homosexual relations in some form are not empirically uncommon. A. Kinsey, W.
Pomeroy & C. Martin, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male 610-66 (1948) [hereinafter cited as
Kinsey-Male]. Freud had earlier observed: "The less repellent of the so-called sexual perversions
are very widely diffused among the whole population, as everyone knows except medical writers
upon the subject." S. Freud, Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria, in 7 The Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 51 (standard ed. 1905) Ihereinafter cited as Standard
Edition].
56. See note- 281 infra. In addition, homosexuality must be distinguished from transsexualism
and transvegtism. Transsexuals literally suppose themselves to be of the opposite gender, a male
in a female body, or conversely. See J. Money & P. Tucker, Sexual Signatures 31-35 t1975).
Homosexuals in general are not confused about their gender; they may. for example, insistently
affirm that they are men or women, as the case may be. See note 251 infra and accompanying
text. Definitionally, they are homosexuals because of their preference for intercourse with
partners of the same sex. Finally, transvestites prefer to dress and act like members of the
opposite gender. J. Money & P. Tucker, Sexual Signatures 25-31 (1975). Many of them are not
homosexuals; and homosexuals are not in general transvestites.
57- See notes 39-43 supra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 154-59 infra and accompanying text.
59. See Plato, Laws, Book VIII 835d-842a. which gives crucial significance to whether
homosexuality has been acquired through no fault of the homosexual. See also Nicomachean,
supra note 37, at Book VII, 1148b-1149a. Plato's view of the unnaturalness of homosexual acts in
the Laws is not a departure from the views of the earlier dialogues, which imply or state such a
view. See G. Vlastos, The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato, in Platonic Studies 27-28
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Vlastos].
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women. 60 Second, Plato argued that male sexuality has one proper
form or nature, namely, procreation within marriage, and that
homosexuality is unnatural because it is sterile. This latter thought
rests on the pervasive Greek conception that everything in the physical
world has a precisely defined proper function. Thus, for example,
Aristotle argued that usury is unnatural and violative of the proper
function of money. 6'
The idea that homosexuality involves the degradation of a man to
the status of a woman is at least strongly suggested by the seeming
prohibitions on male homosexuality in the Old Testament 62 and by St.
60. That is, it would be self-degradation for men to allow themselves to make love to, or to be
made love to by, a man, which is the proper role of a woman. This conception is also implicit in
the idea, pervasive in the ancient Greek and Roman worlds, that while homosexuality per se was
not wrong, to allow oneself to be the passive partner (i.e., the woman) was shameful and
degrading. The aggressively bisexual Julius Caesar, thus, was criticized not for his homosexual
connections, but for permitting himself at one time to be the passive partner, See Catullus 57
where Caesar is insulted by being called "morbosus," i.e., passive (equivalent to the Greek
"pathicus"). Catullus himself indulged in homosexual activities. See T. Vanggaard, Phallos 87-99
(1972). See also note 250 infra. The ancient Greek conception that women are degraded is
well-known. Aristotle believed that women had a nature better than a slave but inferior to a man.
Aristotle, Politics 1259a-b. Plato, in contrast, was remarkable among Greek thinkers for his
readiness to concede equality to women. See Republic, Book V, 453a-457d. Plato's views did not,
however, extend to his notion of roles in sexual intercourse, where he followed the conventional
view. See note 59 supra. See also Thucydides 2.45.2. In Pericles' famous funeral oration he
addresses the women of Athens briefly: "Your great glory is not to be inferior to what god has
made you, and the greatest glory of a woman is to be least talked about by men, whether they are
praising you or criticizing you."
Indeed, theorists as disparate as Plato and Kant supposed that sexual deviance degraded
human beings even below animals, since animals were supposed not to be sexually deviant. Thus,
Kant argues that homosexuality is unnatural in that it "degrades mankind below the level of
animals, for no animal turns in this way from its own species." I. Kant, Lectures on Ethics 170
(L. Infield trans. 1963). Cf. Vlastos, supra note 59.
61. Aristotle, Politics 1257a-1258b. See J. Noonan, Tokos and Atokion' An Examination of
Natural Law Reasoning Against Usury and Against Contraception, 10 Nat. L. For. 215 (1965).
62. "Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination." Leviticus
18:22. "If a man also lie with mankind as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed
an abomination; they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them." Id. 20:13. See
also the Sodom and Gomorrah episode. Genesis 19. This episode, traditionally taken to show that
homosexuality is contrary to God's will in that He punished those cities by fire and brimstone, is
apparently not about homosexuality at all, however. See D. Bailey, Homosexuality and the
Western Christian Tradition 1-28 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Bailey]; J. McNeill, The Church and
the Homosexual 42-50 (1976). Even the seemingly clear Leviticus prohibitions have been analyzed
by scholars as not being about homosexuality per se. See, e.g., S. Driver, Deuteronomy 264
(1896); McNeill, supra at 56-60; N. Snaith, The Century Bible, Leviticus and Numbers 126 n.22
(1967). Others scholars, however, disagree about this latter prohibition. See Bailey, supra at 30
Even Catholic theologians have argued that these prohibitions do not attack or condemn
exclusive homosexuals: "[The Scriptures'] aim is not to pillory the fact that some people
experience this perversion inculpably. They denounce a homosexuality which had become the
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Paul's statement of these prohibitions in the context of rigidly defined
sex roles. 63 The early Christian Church absorbed the Platonic-
Aristotelian notion that homosexual acts are unnatural. The church's
view was further grounded on a probable misinterpretation of the Old
Testament prohibitions, 64 perhaps caused by the influence of the
Pauline prohibitions. These homosexuality prohibitions, when enacted
into Roman law by the early Christian emperors, were interpreted not
merely as prohibiting the unnatural for Plato's reasons, but also as
combatting pestilence, plague, and natural disaster.6  Justinian, for
example, based on a probable misinterpretation of the Sodom and
Gomorrah legend, supposed that the existence of homosexual acts was,
in fact, causally responsible for the recent occurrences of floods,
earthquakes, and plagues. Consequently, Justinian prohibited
homosexual acts on pain of death or torture or both. 66
Finally, the Christian interpretation of the unnaturalness of
homosexuality was consolidated and given theoretical statement by St.
Thomas's reformulation of St. Augustine's view that the only proper
"genital commotion" 67 is that aimed toward the reproduction of the
species in marriage. 68 Since sexual drives operate quite independently
prevalent fashion and had spread to many who were really quite capable of normal sexual
sentiments. .... Lack of frank discussion has allowed a number of opinions to be formed about
[homosexuals] which are unjust when applied generally, because those who have such inclinations
in fact are often hard-working and honourable people." A New Catechism 384-85 (K. Smith
trans. 1967), cited in In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Cf. Bailey, supra at
x-xii (similar distinction between the invert and pervert).
63. See, e.g., Romans 1:26, 27; 1 Corinthians 6:9, 10; 1 Corinthians 11:14, 15. For an
interpretation that these passages are not about homosexuality per se. see J. McNeill, The Church
and the Homosexual 37-66 (1976).
64. See note 62 supra.
65. Bailey, supra note 62, at 70-81. Homosexuality entered Roman jurisprudence as a capital
crime by the Theodosian law of A.D. 390. See id. at 71-72.
66. See Justinian, Novellae 77 and 141, reprinted in Bailey, supra note 62, at 73-75. The
issuance of these imperial edicts seems to have been prompted by contemporary earthquakes,
floods and plagues, which Justinian, drawing an analogy to the Sodom and Gomorrah episode,
supposed to be caused by homosexual practices. Id. at 76-77. For a description of some tortures
inflicted upon homosexuals, see id. at 78-79. Blackstone similarly cites the Sodom and Gomorrah
episode, in support of the appropriateness of the death penalty for homosexual acts, indeed
suggesting-since God there punished by fire-the special appropriateness of death by burning. 4
W. Blackstone, Commentaries *216.
67. This phrase appears in Catholic theological commentaries on the obscene and unnatural.
See, e.g., Gardiner, Moral Principles Towards a Definition of the Obscene, 20 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 560, 567 (1955).
68. See Augustine, 1 The City of God 470-72 (M. Dods trans. 1950). St. Thomas is in accord
with Augustine's view. Of the emission of semen apart from procreation in marriage, he wrote:
"[Alfter the sin of homocide whereby a human nature already in existence is destroyed, this type
of sin appears to take next place, for by it the generation of human nature is precluded." 3 T.
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of the will (let alone the will to reproduce), 69 sexuality was a natural
object of continuing shame to St. Augustine. 70 It follows from this
view that certain rigidly defined kinds of "natural" intercourse in
conventional marriage are moral; extramarital and of course homosex-
ual intercourse are forbidden. 71 Building on these Augustinian founda-
tions, St. Thomas argued that, even granting that homosexual acts
between consenting adults harm no one, it is still unnatural and
immoral, for it is an offense to God himself who has ordained
procreation as the only legitimate use of sexuality. 72 St. Thomas thus
takes the Platonic view-namely, that human sexuality has a distinct
purpose-and gives it a theological interpretation. Homosexuality is
unnatural not primarily because it degrades proper human function,
but because it violates divine law which sanctions that function.
On the basis of such views, there arose the conviction that homosex-
uality was a heresy, a clear and flagrant violation of express divine
command. Accordingly, throughout the Middle Ages, homosexuals
were prosecuted as heretics, often being burned at the stake. 73 With
the association of religious and secular law, one can further understand
the association, even in contemporary literature, of homosexuality and
Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith: Summa Contra Gentiles pt. 2 ch. 122(9), at 146 (V.
Bourke trans. 1946).
69. The fact that sexual desire is not a proper object of the will, and that a main feature of
certain kinds of inadequate sexual function is the very attempt to will it, are a main theme of tile
therapy of Masters and Johnson. See W. Masters & V. Johnson, Human Sexual Inadequacy
198-99, 202-03 (1970). The conception, thus, of certain religious traditions (namely, that "proper"
sexual experience must be accompanied by certain kinds of wills and intentions) may account for
the association of defective sexual function with rigid religious sexual conceptions. See generally
id. at 10, 24, 70, 117-20, 133, 135, 139, 144, 175-76, 177-79, 189, 213, 253-56.
70. "[T]his lust, of which we at present speak, is the more shameful on this account, because
the soul is therein neither master of itself, so as not to lust at all, nor of the body, so as to keep the
members under control of the will; for if it were thus ruled, there would be no shame."
Augustine, 2 The City of God 40 (M. Dods trans. 1948). Cf. note 69 supra.
71. One prominent account of the Catholic view notes that Catholic canon law "holds, as a
basic and cardinal fact, that complete sexual activity and pleasure is licit and moral only in a
naturally completed act in valid marriage. All acts which, of their psychological and physical
nature, are designed to be preparatory to the complete act, take their licitness and their morality
from the complete act. If, therefore, they are entirely divorced from the complete act, they are
distorted, warped, meaningless, and hence immoral." Gardiner, Moral Principles Towards a
Definition of the Obscene, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 560, 564 (1955). Cf. T. Bouscaren. A. Ellis
& F. Korth, Canon Law 930 (1963); H. Gardiner, Catholic Viewpoint on Censorship 62-67
(1958). For a critique, see R. Haney, Comstockery in America 88-96 (1960).
72. Summa Theologica II-II, Q. cliv. I, II, and XII.
73. See Bailey, supra note 62, at 135. See generally S. Runciman, The Medieval Manichee
(1947). Thus, "buggery," one of the names for homosexual acts, derives from a corruption of the
name of one heretical group alleged to engage in homosexual practices. See Bailey, supra note 62,
at 141, 148-49.
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treason. 74 Homosexuality was perceived as undermining the founda-
tions of the state because it was a defiance of the divine law, which
was conceived to be the basis of the state.
This religious condemnation of sexual deviance strongly influenced
the Anglo-American secular prohibitions. Thus, during the Middle
Ages in England, homosexuality was, along with heresy, blasphemy,
witchcraft, adultery, and the like, within the jurisdiction of the
ecclesiastical courts. 7 5 The first English statute forbidding homosexual
acts76 was not enacted until the English Reformation when Henry VIII
transferred powers of the ecclesiastical courts to the king's courts. 7 7
When Henry's statute was revived under Elizabeth I, the new statute,
confirming the religious grounds of its legitimacy, recited that the law
was made necessary to combat the prevalence of the "horrible and
detestable vice of buggery, aforesaid, to the high displeasure of Al-
mighty God."'78 Blackstone refused, following St. Thomas, even to
mention sexual deviance, referring to it as "the infamous crime against
nature, committed either with man or beast . . . the very mention of
which is a disgrace to human nature, ' 79 citing Old Testament prohib-
itions and the Sodom and Gomorrah legend for the appropriateness of
capital punishment (preferably, it seems, by burning).8 0
The very Blackstonian language of condemnation was imitated in
American colonial statutes and continues to be used in statutes of some
American states.8 1 However, because of constitutional objections to
the vagueness of the term "unnatural" in criminal statutes,82 the
prohibitions are often described with a specificity which Blackstone
74. See generally P. Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals 9-13 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Devlin].
75. See W. Barnett, Sexual Freedom and the Constitution 80-81 (1973) (hereinafter cited as
Barnett].
76. 25 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1533) (repealed by 9 Geo. 4, c. 31 (1828)).
77. Barnett, supra note 75, at 80.
78. 5 Eliz. 1, c. 17 (1562). See Barnett, supra note 75, at 81.
79. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *215.
80. Id. at *216. Blackstone's invocation of Old Testament texts in support of the intrinsic evil
of homosexuality is echoed in later American judicial opinions. See, e.g.. Dawson v. Vance, 329
F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Tex. 1971), which cites the Sodom and Gomorrah episode at Genesis 19 in
support of the proposition that the "practice is inherently inimical to the general integrity of the
human person." Id. at 1322. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for City of Richmond, 403 F.
Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), which points out that
sodomy statutes have an "ancestry going back to Judaic and Christian law." Id. at 1202
81. See, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws c. 272 § 34 (1968).
82. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alas. 1969); Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21
(Fla. 1971); State v. Sharpe, 1 Ohio App. 2d 425, 205 N.E.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1965). The Supreme
Court has now, however, laid these arguments to rest, at least as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975).
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would have found shocking.8 3 Whatever the form of the law, the laws
of thirty-two states and the District of Columbia impose criminal
penalties on consenting adults who engage in private homosexual
activity.8 4 Most of these statutes prohibit sodomy which includes oral
and anal intercourse between heterosexuals and sexual acts with
minors.8 5 Four states expressly limit their prohibition of consensual
sodomy to homosexual acts.8 6
II. CONTRACTARIAN MORAL THEORY AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO PRIVACY
Having attempted to clarify the notion of the unnatural which
underlies laws prohibiting homosexual acts, we must now develop the
thought that contractarian moral theory illuminates the moral basis
and proper interpretation of the constitutional right to privacy. We
begin with a brief sketch of the development of the constitutional right
to privacy. Then we will focus on the moral principles centrally
relevant to the analysis of this problem (namely, the principles of
justice) and the clarification that these principles bring to the constitu-
ional right to privacy.
1. Present Form of the Constitutional Right to Privacy
The concept of privacy, as an independent legal right, was first
formulated in a famous law review article by Warren and Brandeis. 87
It was there suggested that the mere intrusion upon certain personal
matters-in itself not compensable under then-existing law-should be
regarded as an independent tort. Since then, the "right of privacy" has
been successfully invoked in a wide range of tort cases. Dean Prosser
in 1960 examined three hundred such cases in an attempt to discover
exactly what interest was being protected. He concluded that no single
thing was common to every loss of privacy. But he did note four
characteristics, at least one of which was present in each case, namely:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs.
83. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 26-2002 (1970); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 944.17 (1958).
84. Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 553 n. 1 (1976).
Eighteen states have decriminalized sodomy. See id. at 570 n.93.
85. See Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72
Mich. L. Rev. 1613 & n.1 (1974).
86. See id. These state statutes are: Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3505 (1974); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
510.100 (1975); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 94-2-101 (4), -5-505 (Spec. Crim. Code Pamphlet
1976); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06 (1974).
87. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
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2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness.'8
Subsequent commentary has sought to reduce Prosser's disparate list to
one unifying theme: privacy as the capacity to control information
about oneself or one's experiences.8 9
In constitutional law, privacy is a notion of more recent vintage. At
least prior to 1965, privacy in constitutional law was not regarded as
an independent constitutional right. The word "privacy" nowhere
appears in the Constitution. At most, privacy was viewed as an
interest protected in certain limited respects by various specific con-
stitutional provisions-for example, the third amendment prohibition
of quartering soldiers in the home, the fourth amendment guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures and the fifth amendment
protection against self-incrimination.
The idea of an independent constitutional right to privacy was
introduced in 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut."0 There the Supreme
Court invalidated a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of con-
traceptives as applied to a married couple on the ground that it violated
a constitutional right to privacy protecting the marital relationship.
Justice Douglas, writing for himself and Justice Clark, found that an
independent right to privacy could be inferred from a number of
constitutional provisions. 91 Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Brennan, also found a fundamental right to
marital privacy, inferrable chiefly from the ninth amendment. 92 Only
Justices Harlan and White, who concurred in the judgment, would
find the statute to be violative of the fourteenth amendment's substan-
tive due process guarantees in that it had no rational relation to any
proper state purpose. 93
In 1969 in Stanley v. Georgia,94 the Court held unconstitutional a
88. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960).
89. See, e.g., C. Fried, An Anatomy of Values 140 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Fried]; A
Miller, The Assault on Privacy 25 (1971); A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom 7 (1967); Gross,
Privacy and Autonomy, in Privacy 169 (Nomos XIII) (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971),
Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 275 (1974). For broader definitions, see
Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 962, 1000-07 (1964); Weinstein, The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life, in Privacy 88, 94-96
(Nomos XIII) (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971); Van Den Haag, On Privacy, in id. at
149-53.
90. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
91. Id. at 484-86.
92. Id. at 486-99.
93. Id. at 499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 502-07 (White, J., concurring).
94. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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state statute criminally punishing the mere private possession of
obscene materials. After mentioning the defendant's first amendment
right to receive information, the Court, citing Griswold, invoked the
constitutional right to privacy: "For also fundamental is the right to be
free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmen-
tal intrusions into one's privacy." 95 The Court agreed that individuals
have the right to satisfy their "intellectual and emotional needs in the
privacy of [their] own home[s]." '96
In 1972 the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird97 invalidated the convic-
tion of a campus lecturer for giving a contraceptive device to a young
woman of undisclosed marital status. 98 The state statute under which
the defendant had been convicted prohibited, inter alia, the distribu-
tion to unmarried persons of any "article whatever for the prevention
of conception." 99 Four justices were prepared to hold on equal protec-
tion grounds that unmarried persons must be allowed the same access
to contraceptive devices which the statute accorded to married per-
sons.10 0 The plurality opinion made it clear, however, that the issue of
whether a statute forbidding the distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried persons " 'conflicts with [a] fundamental human right' "101
(i.e., the right to privacy) was not being addressed by the Court. This
was so because, under the equal protection clause, "whatever the
rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights
must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.' 0 2
Nonetheless, the following expansive dictum appears to give broad
support to the idea that the Griswold right to privacy is not strictly
limited to the marital relationship:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital
relationship. Yet the married couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual
and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
95. Id. at 564.
96. Id. at 565.
97. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
98. The Court noted that while the lower court had described the woman as unmarried, the
record contained no evidence as to her marital status. Id. at 440 n. 1.
99. Id. at 441 n.2.
100. Id. at 446-55. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion of the Court, in which he was joined by
Justices Douglas, Stewart and Marshall. Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred In
the result, but reached neither the equal protection nor the right to privacy issues. Justices Powell
and Rehnquist took no part in the decision.
101. Id. at 453, quoting the court below, 429 F.2d 1398, 1402 (1st Cir. 1970).
102. 405 U.S. at 453. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 Fordham
L. Rev. 553, 575-76 (1976).
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matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child.1
0 3
The scope of the right to privacy was further expanded in 1973 in
Roe v. Wade. 104 The Court there held that a Texas statute forbidding
abortion except to save the life of the mother violated the mother's
fundamental right to privacy, "founded in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action
... ."i05 In adopting this rationale, the Court made clear what all but
two Justices in Griswold had avoided saying' 0 6-that the constitu-
tional right to privacy is among the liberties guaranteed by due process
of law. 10 7
Finally, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 0 8 the Court rejected a
privacy-based challenge made by owners of an adult movie house to a
Georgia civil provision allowing injunctive relief against the presenta-
tion of obscene materials. 10 9 The Court held that no general privacy
right-such as that protecting a woman's right to an abortion-
protects the use of obscene materials 01 and that a commercial theatre
is not sufficiently analogous to a private home to merit limited,
place-oriented privacy protection such as was extended in Stanley. "'1
The implications of these precedents for other areas have been a
matter of dispute. 1 12 As regards homosexual conduct, Justice Harlan's
dissent in Poe v. Ullman,1 13 which first discussed marital privacy as a
fundamental right, explicitly excluded homosexual practices. "14 Justice
Goldberg's opinion in Griswold, in which Chief Justice Warren and
103. 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
104. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
105. Id. at 153.
106. See notes 90-93 supra and accompanying text.
107. In Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), the Court invoked the idea of a
woman's right to decide whether to bear a child, recognized in Roe, as part of its reasoning
holding unconstitutional a mandatory pregnancy leave after only four months of pregnancy. Id.
at 639-40.
108. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
109. Addressing the question of the applicability of the first amendment, the Court reiterated
its holding in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), that obscenity is not constitutionally
protected expression, and vacated and remanded the trial court's finding of obscenity for
reconsideration in the light of the new standards enunciated in Miller. Id. at 54-55. For a
criticism of the Miller and Paris opinions, see Free Speech. supra note 5.
110. 413 U.S. at 65-66.
ill. Id.
112. For two admirable general commentaries on the implications of these precedents, see
Note, On Privacy:. Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev 670 (1973);
Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1974)-
113. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
114. Id. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Brennan joined, also excluded deviant sexual conduct from the
right and cited Harlan's language in Poe with approval." 5 Thus, at
least four of the Griswold justices appear to have been unwilling to
expand privacy to include homosexual conduct. On the other hand, a
number of lower courts have either held1 16 or stated in dictum' 1 7 that
statutes forbidding homosexual relations between consenting adults are
unconstitutional on privacy grounds.
The difficulty in predicting the implications of the right to privacy
cases is symptomatic of the unprincipled, amorphous form which the
constitutional right to privacy has had from its inception. Its history
has been more suggestive of legislative fiat than judicial reasoning. 118
This sense of intellectual legerdemain is suggested even by the name
of the right-"the right to privacy." As we have seen, the right of
privacy, as conventionally understood both in the law of torts and in
constitutional law, with relation to illegal searches and seizures and the
like, turns on an individual's right to withhold personal information or
experiences from others.' 19 However, the constitutional right to pri-
vacy, as developed since Griswold, cannot be characterized as merely a
right protecting information control. 120 It involves affirmative personal
rights. This feature of the right to privacy cases, which commentators
had observed even about Griswold, 121 was made quite clear by Roe v.
Wade. In Roe, the challenged law subjected the person performing the
abortion to criminal sanctions and was unconstitutional because it
made it difficult for women to obtain the desired service. There is
not the remotest suggestion in Roe that the state could cure the
constitutional infirmity by removing any criminal sanction from the
woman while continuing effectively to restrict abortion by attacking
115. 381 U.S. 479, 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring),
116. United States v. Doe, No. 71860-71 (D.C. Super. Ct., Feb. 12, 1973), 12 Crim. L. Rep.
2531, rev'd sub. nom. United States v. Montalvo, No. 7301 (D.C. Ct. App., Dec. 13, 1974).
117. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973) (mem.), aff'd on other
grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); In re Labady, 326 F. Supp.
924, 929 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Commonwealth v. Balthazar, - Mass. -, 318 N.E.2d
478 (1974). Cf. Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968); Lovisi
v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 485 (1976); Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (D. Tex. 1970), vacated
on other grounds, 401 U.S. 989 (1970). See also California v. LaRue, 409 US. 109, 132 n. 10
(1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118. See note 28 supra.
119. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
120. For an example of such a strained interpretation, consider Justice Douglas' view of Roe
v. Wade as involving information disclosure issues in the context of the doctor-patient relation-
ship. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 219 (1973).




suppliers of the service. 122 Indeed, since Roe, the Court has insisted
that the Roe-defined right extends to "the doctor's office, the hospital,
the hotel room, or as otherwise required to safeguard the right to
intimacy involved. ' 123 In short, there is no evidence that the constitu-
tional right to privacy depends on outrageous government surveillance
violative of conventional right of privacy interests.
Undoubtedly, there are significant relationships between the conven-
tional right of privacy and the values it protects, and the kind of
personal liberty involved in Griswold and its progeny. First, the
enforcement of laws limiting sexual liberty (e.g., anti-contraception
laws) often would involve particularly egregious forms of interference
with the conventional right of privacy (e.g., searching the bedroom). 12 4
Second, one of the primary underlying values, made possible by the
conventional right of privacy, is the capacity, by informational control,
to create different kinds of intimacy with some but not others, a
capacity fundamental to the growth of friendship and love. 12 Gris-
wold and Roe also apparently were intended to enhance the growth of
intimate relationships by granting forms of intimacy freedom from
governmental control. Third, privacy in the conventional sense (being
left alone without anyone observing) is a generally accepted prerequis-
ite to human sexual intercourse 126 and the protection of sexual activity
seems to be an important aspect of the constitutional right to privacy
cases. 127
These similarities between the conventional right of privacy and the
kind of liberty established in Griswold and its progeny are persuasive
analogies. Reasoning by analogy is, of course, one traditional mode of
legal reasoning by which courts gradually extend or develop precedents
in a principled way. The Court cannot be faulted for using such a
mode of reasoning in developing the implications of constitutional
122. Note Justice Rehnquist's dissent which indicates that the problems implicit in enforcing
abortion laws are completely different from those involved in Griswold. 410 U.S. at 172
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
123. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973).
124. These issues were obviously central in Justice Douglas' mind in the majority opinion in
Griswold where he contrasted the Connecticut criminal statute to other measures, such as
regulation of the sale and manufacture of contraceptives, that would also have achieved the
state's goal of discouraging use. 381 U.S. at 485.
125. See Fried, supra note 89, at 137-52.
126. See C. Ford & F. Beach, Patterns of Sexual Behavior 68-72 (1951) [hereinafter cited as
Ford & Beach]. This is not a characteristic of animal sexual behavior. "A desire for privacy
during sexual intercourse seems confined to human beings. Male-female pairs of other animal
species appear to be unaffected by the presence of other individuals and to mate quite as readily
in a crowd as when they are alone." Id. at 71.
127. See notes 180-204 infra and accompanying text.
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values. The challenge of the right to privacy cases is to articulate in a
principled way the constitutional considerations which have motivated
the Court in this area. 128
The constitutional right to privacy, we have observed, clearly does
not rest on some kind of right of information control. Rather, it turns
on some form of substantive liberty or autonomy' 2 9 to act in certain
ways without threat of governmental sanction, interference, or pen-
alty. The Court's remarks about the nature of this substantive right are
suggestive. Activities protected by the right implicate individuals'
" 'beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations,' " central
values of the " 'right to be left alone.' "130 These experiences are at the
core of "protected intimate relationship[s]"' 131 and require some kind of
sanctuary in order to be properly cultivated and perfected.' 32 These
remarks cry out for more fundamental examination of the right to
privacy in the light of relevant moral theory.
2. The Principles of Justice, Self-Respect as the
Primary Human Good, and Liberty to
Love as a General Good
Contractarian moral theory, we have suggested, has an authoritative
role in the analysis of constitutional values. 133 Accordingly, we turn to
such a moral theory in order to elucidate the problem at hand-the
moral and constitutional values underlying the right to privacy cases.
This Article employs a contractarian analysis, based upon the model
of John Rawls,134 which proposes the following approach: Moral
principles are those that perfectly rational men, irrespective of histori-
cal or personal age, in a hypothetical "original position" of equal
liberty and having all knowledge and reasonable belief except that of
their specific personal situation, would agree to as the ultimate stan-
128. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Wechsler].
129. See note 121 supra.
130. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969), quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
131. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973).
132. In Paris, both the Court's rejection of the principle-well articulated by John Stuart
Mill-that liberty should be limited only to prevent harm to others (see On Liberty, in The
Philosophy of John Stuart Mill 197 (M. Cohen ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as On LibertyD and its
citation of the adage "a man's home is his castle," 413 U.S. at 66, suggests that the source of the
value placed on the "privacy of the home" in Stanley, which Paris reaffirms, arises from the
significance in one's life of a private sanctuary for personal relationships.
133. See notes 15-24 supra and accompanying text.
134. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) [hereinafter cited as Rawls). See also Action, supra
note 24, at 75-91.
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dards of conduct that are applicable at large. 135 Since our concern is to
apply this definition of moral principles to develop a theory of justice,
we must introduce into the orginal position the existence of conflicting
claims to a limited supply of goods and consider a specific set of
principles to regulate these claims. 136
"General goods" are those things or conditions that are typically the
objects of rational choices as the generalized means to a variety of
particular desires. 137 Liberty, in all its manifestations, is usually
classified as one of these general goods. Similarly, it is natural to
identify capacities, opportunities and wealth as general goods. 138
The original position presents a problem of rational choice under
uncertainty. Rational men in the original position have no way of
predicting the probability that they will end up in any given situation
in life. If a person agrees to principles of justice that permit depriva-
tions of liberty and property rights and later discovers that he occupies
a disadvantaged position, he will have no just claim against depriva-
tions which may render his entire life prospects meager and bitterly
servile. To avoid such consequences, the rational strategy in choosing
the basic principles of justice would be the conservative "maximin"
strategy; 39 one would want to make certain that the worst position in
the adopted system is the best of all conceivable worst positions-that
is, one would maximize the minimum condition. Thus, if a person were
born into the worst possible situation of life allowed by the adopted
moral principles, he would still be better off than he would be in the
worst situation allowed by other principles. The rational decision on
such principles requires consideration of the relative weight assigned
the general goods by those in the original position.
Self-respect or self-esteem occupies a place of special prominence.
People desire general goods-liberties, opportunities, wealth-in order
to attain self-respect through the fulfillment of their life plan; self-
respect will thus be referred to as the primary human good.' 4 People
135. See Rawls, supra note 134, at 11-22.
136. If there were goods in abundant superfluity, or if people were more willing to sacrifice
their interests for the good of others, the need for a moral system might be nonexistent or
significantly different. For David Hume's remarkable discussion of the conditions of moderate
scarcity, see D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 485, 495 (1888).
137. Rawls describes these general goods as "things which it is supposed a rational man wants
whatever else he wants." Rawls, supra note 134, at 92. The notion of rationality considered here
is developed in Action, supra note 24, at 2 7-48. See also Fried. supra note 89. at 87- 101. Rawls,
supra note 134, at 407-16. The general view of the good is discussed in id. at 395-452 and in
Action, supra note 24, at 286-91.
138. Rawls, supra note 134, at 92; see Equal Opportunity, supra note 4. at 41-49
139. See Rawls, supra note 134, at 150-61.
140. See id. at 433, 440-46.
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in the original position would regulate access to the general goods so as
to maximize the possibility that each member of society will be able to
attain self-respect.
Self-respect is based on one's ability to exercise his capacities compe-
tently.141 Human beings have complex capacities including the ability
to think and deliberate, to use language, to create artifacts of a
practical or aesthetic nature, to plan and shape life in terms of desires
and aspirations over time, 142 and the like. Deprived of the experience
of personal competence and self-mastery, humans lack a sense of
self-worth, leading to the despairing inner death central to apathy,
cynicism, stoical remoteness, and spiritual slavery. 
43
Another conclusion of contractarian theory is that, in reaching an
agreement upon a system of morality and justice, people in the original
position will give priority to the maximization of liberties. At least
after a minimal level of wealth has been secured to all people, the
original contractors would not accept limitations on their freedom in
exchange for enhanced economic well-being. Maximization of liberty
best enables all people to attain fulfillment, and thus self-respect, by
opening up myriad possible areas of experience and endeavor.
Of course, it does not follow that in a just society everyone is unconcerned with
matters of status.... But in a well-ordered society the need for status is met by the
public recognition of just institutions, together with the full and diverse internal life of
the many free communities of interests that equal liberty allows. The basis for
self-esteem in a just society is not then one's income share but the publicly affirmed
distribution of fundamental rights and liberties. And this distribution being equal,
everyone has a similar and secure status when they meet to conduct the common
affairs of the wider society. 14
4
The liberties distributed by the principles of justice typically include
liberties of thought and expression (freedom of speech, the press,
religion, and association), civic rights (impartial administration of civil
and criminal law in defense of property and person), political rights
(the right to vote and participate in political affairs), and freedom of
physical, economic, and social movement. The importance of these
liberties rests on their relation to the primary good of self-respect, since
these liberties nurture personal competences, for example, full expres-
141. Action, supra note 24, at 257, 265-68. See R. White, Ego and Reality in Psychoanalyti-
cal Theory: A Proposal Regarding Independent Ego Energies, 3 Psychological Issues, Monograph
No. 11, ch. 7 (1963).
142. For the notion of a lifeplan, see Rawls, supra note 134, at 407-16; Fried, supra note 89,
at 105-15; Action, supra note 24, at 27-48, 63-74.
143. Psychologists deal with this as the problem of depression. See, e.g., A. Lowen,
Depression and the Body 17-39 (1972).
144. Rawls, supra note 134, at 544.
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sion of the spirit, self-direction, security of the person, and the
possibility of unhampered movement. 45 The original contractors thus
would wish to ensure that all citizens enjoy these liberties. In the
United States this has been accomplished through the constitutional
guarantees of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Full liberty to enjoy and express love deserves to be recognized as an
additional general good since it similarly develops self-respect. First,
love in some form is a necessary ingredient of a fulfilled life. Whether
such love is for a specific individual, a number of individuals or even
for an abstract entity, love is part of what is commonly meant by the
meaning of life. Its absence renders a life plan incoherent and the life
of the spirit deformed and miserable. 146 Second, love in its sexual
forms affords a uniquely ecstatic experience, for it makes available to
modern man experiences increasingly inaccessible to him in his public
life: self-transcendence, expression of private fantasy, release of inner
tensions, and socially acceptable expression of regressive desires to be
again the omnipotent child-unafraid to lose control, playful, vulner-
able, spontaneous, sensually loved. 147 While people may choose to
forego love, any coercive prohibitioji of certain forms of it would be a
deprivation of a uniquely significant experience. Third, such love in its
sexual forms is a crucial ingredient of the human capacity to form
lasting personal relationships and thus facilitates the special good that
these relationships afford in human life.148 Human beings are sexually
responsive throughout the year, not just during the period of possible
fertilization and procreation, as is generally the case with other mam-
mals. 149 This greater capacity for sensual experience is an ingredient of
the distinctively human capacity for lasting, profound personal rela-
tionships, because the possibility of continuing sensual experience
renders the relationship one of continuing delight.' 50 Such durable
relationships founded on sexual intimacy are happily denominated, in
the Biblical locution, a form of knowledge, for they afford to people
the capacity for a secure disclosure of self, not only through exposure
145. For a fuller development of this element of the moral theory of free speech, see Free
Speech, supra note 5.
146. The damaging effects of deprivation of love on young children are increasingly well-
evidenced. See generally J. Bowlby, Child Care and the Growth of Love (1975)i M. Rutter,
Maternal Deprivation Reassessed (1972); 1 J. Bowlby, Attachment and Loss (1969).
147. See M. Balint, Primary Love and Psychoanalytic Technique 109-17 (1952).
148. On the values of these relationships, see Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for
Persons, in Privacy 16 (Nomos XIII) (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971)
149. See Ford & Beach, supra note 126, at 199-267.
150. See I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Love and Hate 155-69 (1972). A similar theme pervades W.
Masters & V. Johnson, The Pleasure Bond (1974).
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of sexual vulnerabilities, but also through the sharing of recesses of the
self otherwise remote and inaccessible. 151 It is no accident, therefore,
that these relationships are regarded as of fundamental importance
among the strategic decisions in one's life plan. Whom one marries, for
example, is conventionally conceived of as a decision at least as
strategically important as the choice of occupation.15 2 Like this deci-
sion, the choice of one's lover shapes one's entire self-conception--one's
sense of personal possibilities and the kind of person one wants to
become over time. The disclosures of self that love involves, the
mutual shaping of expectations and life styles, the sharing of common
aspirations and hopes-all these, and others, suggest the extraordinary
significance of decisions about matters of love in human life, and
further support the proposition that freedom to love should be consid-
ered a general good. Fourth and finally, love in its sexual forms
expresses itself in the desire to participate with the beloved in the
development of and care for common projects created by the relation-
ship, some of which take on a durable character in terms of objects or
activities or even persons who survive the relationship and thus
embody its lasting value.1
5 3
Love is conceptually defined by its peculiar aims, beliefs, and
experiences-for example, the intensity of the experience (one does not
typically feel moderately in love), the desire to promote the good of
another, the identification of another's interests as one's own (ex-
periencing joy when the other is joyful, sadness when the other is sad),
the desire for physical and psychological closeness (lovers naturally live
together).' 54 The concept of love says nothing about the form its
physical expression might take other than, for example, that it involves
forms of intimate closeness expressing the evident intention of good to
another. Thus, sexual intercourse enables one to express love through
the sharing of pleasure. It is a logical truth that love cannot be
expressed by nonconsensual sadism. Short of that, however, there is no
ideal or exclusive or proper physical expression of sexual love, for a
large and indeterminate class of forms of sexual intercourse is compat-
ible with the aims of love.
151. See Fried, supra note 89, at ch. IX.
152. The gravity of this choice was stressed as early as Aristotle's seminal discussion of
friendship. See Nicomachean, supra note 37, at Book VIII; cf. Action, supra note 24, at 266-67.
153. The thought that falling in love involves thinking of the love object as the parent of a
common child, understood either physically or metaphorically as a common interest fostered by
the relationship, is as old as Plato. Plato Symposium 206c et seq.; see, for other statements of the
view, M. Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy (P. Heath trans. 1954); A. Schopenhauer, 2 The
World as Will and Representation 531-67 (E. Payne trans. 1958).
154. See Action, supra note 24, at 250-59. Cf. Nicomachean, supra note 37, at 1157b.
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These observations illustrate in a striking way the profound philo-
sophical error in Augustine's classic and influential model of sexual-
ity. 155 Augustine supposed human sexuality always to be a Wild,
incoherent animal passion whose drives undermine human capacities
for self-control. He believed that complete human self-control would
result in the use of sexuality only for procreation within marriage and
that human beings experience shame over their sexuality when they do
not experience sex in the only proper way. Augustine's conception,
however, both underestimates the distinctively human capacity for
self-control over sexual desire and overestimates the force of sexuality
as a kind of dark, Bacchic possession, incapable of human control.
Human sexuality, as sexologists have emphasized, 5 6 is, unlike all
other comparable biological appetites, malleable and subject to con-
scious control. Humans can and do postpone engaging in it in-
definitely, and sometimes for a lifetime; they use sexuality for diverse
purposes-to express love, for recreation, or for procreation. No one
purpose necessarily dominates; rather, human self-control chooses
among the purposes depending on context and person. The extraordi-
nary human capacity for sensual experience, not tied to the repro-
ductive function, is a central aspect of the human competence to
sustain longstanding and intense personal relationships which rest, in
part, on the possibility of reciprocal sexual delight.1s 7 Augustine and
the tradition he fostered failed to see these distinctive ways in which
humans can regulate their sexual lives. They failed to understand the
wholly natural human competence to control one's sexual life, suppos-
ing unnatural the most natural use of sexuality, namely, as a way to
express love between two people.15 8 Indeed, from this perspective, we
can see that the Augustinian idea that procreation is the only proper
end of sexuality is, at best, a plausible description of the animal, not
the human, world. If anything, the distinctive mark of natural human
sexuality is that it is not narrowly tied to procreation. A more exact use
of the "natural-unnatural" distinction would, therefore, be to call the
exclusive use of sex for procreation unnatural for humans, though
155. See notes 68-72 supra and accompanying text.
156. See W. Masters & V. Johnson, Human Sexual Inadequacy 10 (1970): "Seemingly, many
cultures and certainly many religions have risen and fallen on their interpretation and misin-
terpretation of one basic physiological fact. Sexual functioning is a natural physiological process,
yet it has a unique facility that no other natural physiological process, such as respiratory,
bladder, or bowel function, can imitate. Sexual responsivity can be delayed indefinitely or
functionally denied for a lifetime. No other basic physiological process can claim such malleability
of physicial expression."
157. See note 150 supra.
158. This uniquely human capacity is the basis of the spiritual and aestheuc dimension of
human sexual love. See D. de Rougemont, Love in the Western World (M. Belgion trans. 1956).
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natural for animals. Thus, sexual relations between same-sexed
partners need not be included within the notion of "unnatural acts";
homosexuality is not necessarily an impairment of proper function. 15 9
We will now introduce these considerations regarding love into the
contractarian model of moral principles. We noted earlier that choice
in the original position is choice under uncertainty: rational men
in the original position have no way of predicting the probability that
they may end up in any given situation of life. By definition, none
of the contractors knows his own sex, age, native talents, particular
capacity for self-control, social or economic class or position, or in
general the particular form of his desires (e.g., whether he likes
asparagus or spinach; or is homosexual or heterosexual). Each contrac-
tor will be concerned that he not end up in a disadvantaged situation
where he will have no appeal to moral principles to denounce depriva-
tions which may render his life prospects bitter and mean. To avoid
such consequences, the rational strategy in choosing the basic princi-
ples of justice would be the "maximin" strategy. 160
As we have suggested, the contractors in the original position would
regard self-respect as the primary good. Accordingly, their focus would
be on principles which would ensure that people have the maximum
chance of attaining self-respect. Under such principles, people would
not be constrained to love or not to love, or to love in certain ways and
not others, or to love with certain consequences but not others.' 6'
Freedom to love would mean that a mature individual must have
autonomy to decide how to or whether to love another. Restrictions on
the form of love imposed in the name of the distorting rigidities of
convention which bear no relation to individual emotional capacities
and needs would be condemned. Individual autonomy, in matters of
love, would ensure the development of people who could call their
emotional nature their own, secure in the development of attachments
which bear the mark of spontaneous human feeling and which touch
one's original impulses. In contrast, restrictions on this individual
autonomy would starve one's emotional capacities, withering individ-
ual feeling into conventional gesture and strong native pleasures into
vicarious fantasies. ' 62  Further, the opportunity to give in-
159. See notes 39-58 supra and accompanying text. It will be argued that homosexual acts are
not, in fact, unnatural. See notes 238-47 infra and accompanying text.
160. See note 139 supra and accompanying text.
161. Note also Fourier's striking conception that, just as the utopian state has a duty to
supply a minimum of food, it has a duty to supply a minimum of sexual gratification to all
citizens. The Utopian Vision of Charles Fourier 336-40 (J. Beecher & R. Bienvenu eds. 1971),
162. See the similar arguments in On Liberty, supra note 132, at ch. III. For one example of
such vicarious fantasy, see note 322 infra.
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stitutionalized expression to love is an important element in the full
realization of self-respect. The idea here is that social institutions are to
be arranged so that people are accorded fair opportunity to form love
relationships according to their desires, and to receive whatever in-
stitutional recognition is necessary to perfect such relationships. One
central institution obviously is marriage. 63 Because liberties, oppor-
tunities, and capacities relating to love figure so importantly in the
quest for self-respect, the rational contractors would not agree to any
principle which would permit restrictions upon these liberties, oppor-
tunities, and capacities. Inequality in distribution of general goods in
general is consistent with the "maximin" strategy of rational choice
only where it would in fact work out for the benefit of the worst off.
For example, inequality in the distribution of wealth and income might
satisfy this condition if such inequality would encourage especially
talented people to become trained and to perform functions which
would "result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular
for the least advantaged members of society.' 6 4 But, as regards
liberties, opportunities and capacities relating to love, no such effect
exists. The greater access of some to love, made possible by the greater
distribution to them of such liberties, opportunities and capacities, can
not afford commensurable advantages making the most disadvantaged
better off. Those with less liberty, opportunity and capacity to love
would suffer a wounding deprivation of a fundamental ingredient of a
fulfilled human personality for which nothing can compensate. Use of
the "maximin" strategy in choosing principles relating to liberty,
opportunity and capacity to love, then, tends to eliminate the disad-
vantaged class: the highest lowest condition is equality for all persons.
The following principle of justice would thus be accepted in the
original position:
163. The capacity for love turns on early childhood experiences. A difficult or tormented
childhood may result in the meagre development of emotional capacities for attachment and love.
See note 146 supra. An emotionally abundant childhood may richly endow a child with such
capacities. In addition, love, like other complex human capacities, requires forms of guidance and
education, the absence of which retards the development of the intelligent competence to
understand what love offers and involves. No small part of this requisite training is adequate sex
education. Interestingly, the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography adopted its proposal for
the liberalization of obscenity law in the light of its recommendations of the need for better sex
education. United States Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, Report of the Commission
on Obscenity and Pornography 47-48, 58, 265-79 (1970). For an identical view, see B. Russell,
Marriage and Morals 93-117 (1929). Since the developed capacity for love is a general human
good, child rearing and educational institutions must be so regulated as to secure a fair
opportunity to develop these capacities.
164. Rawls, supra note 134, at 14-15. See sources cited in note 165 infra. See also, Action, supra
note 24, at 120-32.
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The principle of love as a civil liberty.
Basic institutions are to be arranged so that every person is guaranteed the greatest
liberty, opportunity and capacity to love, compatible with a like liberty, opportunity
and capacity for all.
The derivation of this principle, being a specification of the more
general principles of justice,1 65 depends on the preliminary assumption
that the contractors are ignorant of their particular desires, nature and
circumstances. The contractors thus cannot appeal to special religious
duties to procreate to override the equal liberty to love; nor can there
be appeals to any taste or distaste for certain forms of the physical
expression of love in order to override the equal liberty to love. Rather,
the contractors' reasoning in the original position will depend on
empirical inference and knowledge. Arguments based on perceptions
and intuitions not admissible in the original position must be rejected.
Finally, we must ask whether the contractarian model will yield any
other moral principles relevant to the question of sexual liberty. Thus,
on contractarian grounds, one may easily derive principles forbidding
killing or the infliction of harm or gratuitous cruelty. 166 These princi-
ples would be accepted because they ensure a higher lowest. Such
moral principles obviously are relevant to the expression of love; lovers
should not inflict serious and irreparable bodily harm on one another,
even if such harm is intended as an expression of consensual love. 167
Similarly, moral principles of fidelity can be derived from the original
position. 168 Such principles obviously put constraints on sexual free-
dom once loving relationships have been voluntarily and maturely
entered into.
In addition, the contractarian model justifies a moral principle of
paternalism in certain carefully delimited circumstances. 169 Thus, the
contractors would be aware that people such as children or the
mentally deficient or insane lack the developed capacities of rational
choice and deliberation, or that people may fail to exercise their
developed capacities of rational choice in ways damaging to their life
and limb. In such extreme circumstances, it would ensure a higher
lowest if such people were paternalistically dissuaded or prevented
165. For a derivation of the more general principles of justice, see Free Speech, supra note 5,
at 59-65; Equal Opportunity, supra note 4, at 41-49.
166. See Action, supra note 24, at 176-85.
167. On this view, forms of sadism, not inflicting serious or irreparable harm, may be morally
practiced among consenting adults. Id. at 179-80. Whether the law can or should, as a matter of
sound administration, adopt these moral distinctions is another question. Cf. id. at 184-85.
168. See id. at ch. IX.
169. See Action, supra note 24, at 192-95; Dworkin, Paternalism, in Morality and the Law
107 (R. Wasserstrom ed. 1971).
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from seriously damaging behavior. Accordingly, in such circum-
stances, interference would be morally justified, indeed sometimes
morally required.
Such a paternalistic principle is relevant to certain cases of the
physical expression of love. For example, it may justify some kind of
lower age limit on marriage or even sexual relations in general; it
might also justify interferences in forms of extreme sexual sadism.
3. Judicial Review and the Constitutional Right to Privacy
Contractarian theory makes two kinds of theoretical contributions to
the analysis of constitutional law and values. First, it explains the
overall purpose of constitutional adjudication. Second, it affords a
method for clarifying the moral basis of particular constitutional
values. Particular constitutional rights, like the right to privacy, exist
within the larger framework of established constitutional traditions.
Accordingly, a brief examination of the contribution of contractarian
theory to this larger framework will give necessary background to the
detailed examination of the constitutional right to privacy.
In general, constitutional adjudication is characterized by two per-
vasive structural features. First, judicial review on constitutional
grounds is fundamentally counter-majoritarian. The idea of such judi-
cial review and invalidation of existing law rests on the founding
fathers' deep distrust of absolute majority rule, and their intention to
afford institutional constraints on the capacity of majority will to
trample on the rights of minorities. 70 Second, judicial review is
intended to protect certain kinds of moral rights. The founding fathers
believed that the rights guaranteed, for example, in the Bill of Rights
were natural moral rights which government had no authority to
transgress. Man, they supposed, is foremost a moral being, and
secondarily a member of a political union. Once having joined such a
union, he retains moral status as a person and is immune from legal
claims that violate that status. This is one of the basic ideas of the
social contract theory of natural rights, familiar to the founders
through the writings of John Locke and others. 71 This moral percep-
tion underlies the idea of judicial review and invalidation on constitu-
tional grounds. Literally, laws which violate certain kinds of moral
rights are invalid.
170. Note the remarks of Alexander Hamilton to the effect that judicial supremacy was
intended as a bulwark against "encroachments and oppressions of the representative body," The
Federalist, No. 78, at 462 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). and "serious oppressions of the minor party in
the community." Id. at 469.
171. See note 8 supra.
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Much current constitutional theory flatly fails to account for these
general structural features of constitutional adjudication. 172 Such
theory typically fails to take seriously the counter-majoritarian cast of
the constitutional design, instead limiting or criticizing judicial review
on the ground that it violates the majoritarian will of the people,
which is the alleged fundamental premise of the democratic order.173
Correlatively, these theorists either admit the existence of moral rights
in the contemplated constitutional design but then evince utter skepti-
cism about them, 174 or fail to give any weight at all to the existence of
such moral rights,1 75 sometimes substituting neutral procedural princi-
ples. 176 Having thus failed to appreciate fundamental structural fea-
tures of the constitutional design, it is not surprising that these theories
fail to do justice to the practice of constitutional law in the United
States. 177
Contractarian theory, in contrast, takes seriously the role of natural
rights thinking in the history of the Constitution. Thus, whatever the
historical obscurities which surround the proposal and adoption of the
Bill of Rights, there is little question that the Bill was part of, and
gives expression to, a developing moral system regarding the rights of
man which had been elaborated by Milton and Locke and which found
expression in the works of Rousseau and Kant.17 8 It is not surprising,
therefore, that contractarian theory explains the general structural
features of the constitutional order in a way in which other theories
cannot.
Contractarian theory does not start from the premise of the ultimate
good of majority rule or of neutral principles, nor is the theory
172. This claim is more extensively defended in Moral Criticism, supra note 5, at ch. III. See
also Dworkin, The Jurisprudence of Richard Nixon, N.Y. Rev. of Books, May 4, 1972 at 27.
173. See, e.g., Hand, supra note 1; Thayer, supra note 21.
174. See Hand, supra note 1.
175. See Thayer, supra note 21.
176. See Wechsler, supra note 128, whose procedural thesis, failing to take into account the
fundamental moral principles underlying the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, concludes that the desegregation decisions are improper. Cf. Least Dangerous, supra note
22, at 49-65 (1962); Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L. J. 421 (1960),
Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and
Political Science, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 169 (1968); Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitu-
tional Controversy, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 637 (1961); Heyman, The Chief Justice, Racial
Segregation and The Friendly Critics, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 104 (1961); Miller & Howell, The Myth
of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 661 (1960); Mueller & Schwartz,
The Principle of Neutral Principles, 7 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 571 (1960); Pollak, Racial Discrimina-
tion and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1959); Wright,
Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 769 (1971).
177. See sources cited in note 172 supra.
178. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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skeptical about the possibility of giving reasonable expression to the
moral notions implicit in the constitutional order. On the contrary,
constitutional democracy is conceived of as an attempt to realize the
requirements of the principles of justice.
From the perspective of contractarian theory, it is unlikely that there
is a unique solution to the problem of just constitutional design; rather,
any one of a range of constitutions, involving different institutional
frameworks, might be adopted compatibly with the principles of
justice. However, a form of constitution that is clearly justified by
these principles would be one in which certain requirements of justice,
for example, those established by the principle of greatest equal
liberty, 179 are embodied in the constitution itself as conditions of legal
validity. Constitutional delegates might justly and reasonably recog-
nize the tendency of popular majorities to be short-sighted in not
respecting the liberties of their opponents or of minorities in general.
Majority rule would be justified only to the extent that it is compatible
with the deeper moral principle of greatest equal liberty. To the extent
that judicial review enforces the requirements of this more basic
principle in a way that majority rule cannot, it is morally justified.
Accordingly, one just solution to the problem of constitutional design
would be a constitution like that of the United States in which such
liberties, and others, are themselves embodied in the Constitution.
Further, contractarian theory illuminates the nature and scope of
particular constitutional rights. In dealing with the constitutional right
to privacy, we must focus upon a constitutional right not specifically
cited in the Constitution. Thus, we must consider whether, or to what
extent, the Court may properly develop constitutional rights.
The seminal exposition of this approach was Justice Douglas' opin-
ion in Griswold v. Connecticut.18 0 There Douglas argued that certain
unenumerated rights, including a right to privacy, are found in the
"penumbra" formed by emanations from specific constitutional guaran-
tees. 18 1 He began his analysis of the alleged right by citing a number of
cases where the Court upheld rights not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution.18 2 Freedom of association and other developments of the
first amendment were used to show that the Court had extrapolated
from specific rights in order to protect activities thought to be corol-
laries of those rights.1 8 3 Since the first amendment has a penumbra of
179. See notes 144 & 145 supra and accompanying text. For a derivation of such a general
principle, see Free Speech, supra note 5, at 59-65; Equal Opportunity, supra note 4. at 41-49.
180. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
181. Id. at 484.




protected activity, Douglas inferred that specific guarantees in the Bill
of Rights also can have such penumbras. In particular, the first, third,
fourth and fifth amendments illustrate protections of interests that can
be regarded as forms of "privacy." This pervasive constitutional
concern, together with the ninth amendment's reservation clause, 184
led Douglas to postulate a general right to privacy which exists
independently of specific constitutional guarantees.
Contractarian moral theory affords a solid intellectual and moral
foundation for both the method of reasoning employed in inferring the
constitutional right to privacy, and the specific right there recognized
and later developed. As we have noted, the provisions of the Bill of
Rights and later amendments are remarkably general in form with
legislative history typically nonexistent, meagre or ambiguous. The
scope of "freedom of speech or of the press" in the first amendment, or
"unreasonable searches and seizures" in the fourth amendment, or
"due process of law" in the fifth and fourteenth amendments is not
self-evident. The interpretation of each constitutional liberty has re-
quired a slow process of development through accepted methods of
judicial reasoning. In this process, the Supreme Court has regarded
itself as the ultimate expositor of underlying constitutional values, not
limiting itself to the specific catalogue of rights or remedies which
existed at the time, for example, of passage of the Bill of Rights. 18 In
this regard, the Court has correctly understood that its role in the
constitutional order is to preserve certain durable concepts of justice
which are to act as contraints on majoritarian political bargaining. The
moral values underlying the constitutional order are specified by the
concept of justice and its associated principles, especially the principle
of greatest equal liberty. The specific applications of these principles
may require change over time. To the extent this is so, the Court, in
order to maintain fidelity to constitutional values, must adjust its
interpretation of constitutional provisions in order to ensure that
justice is done in the way that fundamental constitutional principles
require. 186
184. Id. at 484-85. The amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S.
Const. amend. IX. Commentators have questioned the usefulness of this part of Douglas'
argument. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things
Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 235, 243 (1965). One commentator claimed
Douglas' use of this argument had broader implications than Justice Goldberg's similar argument.
See Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 219, 228-29 (1965).
185. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
186. See generally Dworkin, The Jurisprudence of Richard Nixon, N.Y. Rev. of Books, May
4, 1972 at 27-28. My own suggestion here is that the Constitution embodies a general conception
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The earlier analysis, leading to the principle of freedom to love as a
civil liberty, 187 illustrates one form of this change in moral values. The
modern conception of love as independent of procreation or the
possibility of procreation, dictates corresponding shifts in the concep-
tion of the liberties regulated by the principle of greatest equal liberty.
This contractarian analysis could explain and justify the Supreme
Court cases establishing a constitutional right to privacy. We have
observed the pregnant suggestions in these cases to the effect that the
substantive right in question turns on the internal beliefs and emotions
involved in intimate relationships perfected within the sanctuary of the
home.188 We may now discern a possible meaning of these suggestions:
the Court may be working out, through the process required by
contractarian principles, the right to autonomy in deciding how or
whether to love. The broader language in the right to privacy cases
seems to imply an appreciation of the values articulated in this Article
in discussing freedom to love as a general good: the value of love per
se, the significant relationships it makes possible, the quality of sexual
experience, the need for intimate emotional self-disclosure and release
in a sanctuary remote from public roles and pressures, and the like. In
each case the Court has tried to protect these values: especially the
right to pursue them independently of procreation. Thus, prohibitions
of contraception, being clearly violative of the right to decide with
what consequences one will engage in acts of love, were held uncon-
stitutional. 1 89 Proscriptions on the use of pornographic materials in the
privacy of one's home, possibly for non-procreative, masturbatory
purposes, are forbidden. 190 Similarly, the prohibition of abortion limits
the right to decide whether an act will have procreative consequences,
and can affect whether or not one will enter into a new love relation-
ship; thus, such prohibition violates the right of autonomy in love. 191
While one may plausibly believe that other rights may be relevant to
the sound disposition of the abortion issue,' 92 the principle of love as a
of justice-that is, certain fundamental rights derived from the contractarian model are to be
immune from majoritarian political bargaining, but the specific form these rights will take is to
evolve as circumstances and social theory change, This Article proposes a theory of the
constitutional right to privacy as a change in specific conception required by the values of the
general conception of liberty embodied in the constitutional order. Cf. Perry, Abortion, the Public
Morals, and the Police Power. The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 689, 693-722 (1976).
187. See notes 146-69 supra and accompanying text.
188. See notes 103, 130-32 supra and accompanying text.
189. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U S. 479
(1965).
190. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
191. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
192. See, e.g., Wertheimer, Understanding the Abortion Argument, in The Problem of
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civil liberty at least could explain the moral nature of one crucial right
involved in that issue.
The very intellectual process of the Court, in first enunciating the
constitutional right to privacy,' 93 illustrates the kind of reasoning
called for by contractarian principles. In Griswold, Justice Douglas
argued by analogy that various constitutional provisions preserve
values similar to the constitutional right to privacy, and that accord-
ingly that right may be established as an independent value.
These analogies may be stated in more compelling fashion. While
the specific catalogue of rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights is not
involved in the right to privacy cases, the values underlying those
rights are profoundly inplicated in the conception of the liberty to love
as a general good, so that the principles of justice, in light of modern
knowledge, require that that liberty be acknowledged as a constitu-
tional right. First, the idea of sexual love as a form of communication
is a prominent feature of the modern conception of the experience. 294
Surely, autonomy in controlling this form of communication is, to the
modern mind, no less important to individual self-mastery and self-
worth than the conventional forms of verbal communication protected
by the free speech and free press clause of the first amendment.195
Second, the values of freedom of association, 196 which protect the right
of social clubs to engage in racial and religious discrimination, 197
should apply afortiori to the depth of human significance derived by
lovers from this form of association. 198 As we have noted, the decision
Abortion 33 (J. Feinberg, ed. 1973); Brody, Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life, In id. at
104; Brody, Abortion and the Law, in id. at 140.
193. See notes 180-84 supra and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., W. Masters & V. Johnson, The Pleasure Bond 30-31, 139, 228-29 (1975). On
the general idea of nonverbal communication, see J. Benthall & T. Polhemus, The Body as a
Medium of Expression (1975); S. Weitz, Nonverbal Communication (1974). On associated
therapies, see B. Back, Beyond Words (1972).
195. Freedom of speech does extend to some expressive acts. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City
of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969) (picketing); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103-05
(1940) (same). But the Court has stated that "[w]e cannot accept the view that an apparently
limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct
intends thereby to express an idea." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (statute
prohibiting knowing destruction or mutilation of selective service certificate upheld).
196. See, e.g., Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 Yale L.J. 1
(1964).
197. See Comment, Discrimination in Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Association and
Right to Privacy, 1970 Duke L.J. 1181.
198. See Justice Douglas' praise of marriage in Griswold as an "association that promotes a
way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in
our prior decisions." 381 U.S. at 486. More recent cases, notably Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
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on whom one shall love is a fundamental life choice, shaping one's
entire self-conception and life plan.1 99 Third, the privacy interests,
associated with the third, fourth and fifth amendments, are generally
connected with forms of sexual intimacy. Human sexual love must
take place in private and unobserved. 200 Accordingly, privacy, conven-
tionally understood as the control of personal information or experi-
ence,2 01 has one of its most valued uses in protecting sexual inti-
macy.20 2 And fourth, privacy, thus involving the capacity to control
information about oneself, is a crucial ingredient in the capacity for
love since loving relationships require as a prerequsite the possibility of
selective disclosure of certain aspects of oneself to some but not
others.20 3 Thus the values of privacy and love again converge.
Such arguments from analogy strongly imply that the right estab-
lished in Griswold was a logical inference from values previously
accepted. Contractarian theory fills out and gives foundation to these
arguments, showing that this legal development is required by the
underlying principles of the constitutional order: the protection of
fundamental liberties from unjust encroachment by majority rule.
In particular, contractarian theory enables us to see that this right is
not a right of privacy in the conventional sense. 204 Rather, the
constitutionally protected right to privacy established by these cases is
the legal embodiment of a moral principle which ensures to each
person, among other things, the maximum equal liberty, opportunity
and capacity to love.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWS PROHIBITING
UNNATURAL ACTS
It should now be possible to apply the foregoing explication of the
unnatural and the moral analysis of the right to privacy to the issue
raised in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for City of Richmond205
the constitutional permissibility of state prohibition of unnatural acts.
(1973) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), suggest that this description, for purposes of
privacy protection, cannot be limited to the institution of marriage. But see Comment, The
Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 Fordharn L. Rev. 553, 575-76 (1976).
199. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
200. See note 126 supra.
201. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
202. Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold was particularly influenced by the forms of criminal
enforcement that the statute there in question might require (e.g., searching the bedroom). 381
U.S. at 485. See note 124 supra.
203. See Fried, supra note 89 at ch. IX.
204. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.




Doe summarily affirmed the decision of a three-judge district court,
and although this does not necessarily mean that the Court meant to
adopt the opinion of the district court as its own, 20 6 the opinion below
must be given careful consideration. The majority opinion of the
district court held that Virginia's "crimes against nature" statute20 7
was not unconstitutional as applied to private, consensual homosexual
relations between adult males. 20 8
The majority opinion first considered whether consensual adult
homosexual relations came within the constitutional right to privacy
established by Griswold. In focusing on Griswold, the court regarded
as dispositive the fact that Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion cited
with approval the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan in Poe v.
Ullman209 to the effect that the constitutional right to privacy is limited
to marital relationships and does not include homosexual conduct.
Having thus dismissed the relevance of the constitutional right to
privacy, the majority inquired whether there is any other ground for
finding the Virginia sodomy statute unconstitutional and concluded
that the "promotion of morality and decency" 210 is a sufficient basis for
the prohibition even of private, consensual adult conduct. In order to
uphold this aim as a legitimate state purpose, the court held that it is
not necessary "to show that moral delinquency actually results from
homosexuality"; 211 it suffices, rather, "that the conduct is likely to end
in a contribution to moral delinquency. ' 212 As evidence for this latter
proposition, the majority cited Lovisi v. Slayton, 21 3 in which a mar-
206. Recent opinions of the Court make clear that summary affirmances do not necessarily
affirm the grounds of the lower court opinion, only the result reached between the parties in
question. See, e.g., Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1974) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Indeed, the Court now takes the view that summary affirmances have a somewhat attenuated
precedential value, and may expressly be overruled when the Court comes to consider the
matter on the merits. Id. See also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 67! (1974); Colorado Springs
Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 428 U.S. 913 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 83 n.27 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
207. The statute read, in pertinent part: "§ 18.1-212. Crimes against nature.-If any person
shall carnally know in any manner any brute animal, or carnally know any male or female person
by the anus or by or with the mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she
shall be guilty of a felony and shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more
than three years." Law of April 2, 1968, ch. 427, § 1, [19681 Va. Acts 529 (repealed and
superseded 1975) (current version at Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-361 (1975)).
208. 403 F. Supp. at 1200.
209. 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
210. 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1204.
213. 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,




ried couple was convicted of sodomy under the Virginia statute for
participating in acts of fellatio with a third party, where the married
couple's daughters (aged 11 and 13) later distributed pictures of the
said acts in school. The idea seems to be that Lovisi justifies the
proposition that sodomy may lead to moral delinquency-here, cor-
rupting the young. Finally, the court took note of the age of this
sodomy statute, pointing out that it had an "ancestry going back to
Judaic and Christian law,"2" 4 citing in this connection Old Testament
prohibitions. 2 15
Judge Merhige, dissenting, argued that the majority opinion failed
to give weight to the right to privacy opinions after Griswold in which
he contended the right to privacy was extended to unmarried
couples. 21 6 Such opinions, he argued, made it clear that the right to
privacy is not limited to the marriage relationship, and, therefore, the
Goldberg-Harlan limitation of the scope of Griswold can no longer be
regarded as controlling. He noted that these later opinions show that
the right to privacy includes "intimate personal decisions or private
matters of substantial importance to the well-being of individuals,"217
including consensual adult sexual relationships "whether heterosexual
or homosexual. "21 8 Having identified a fundamental right, which the
sodomy statute limited, Judge Merhige argued that the Virginia statute
could be upheld only if it had a compelling justification. He noted:
To suggest, as defendants do, that the prohibition of homosexual conduct will in some
manner encourage new heterosexual marriages and prevent the dissolution of existing
ones is unworthy of judicial response. In any event, what we know as men is not
forgotten as judges-it is difficult to envision any substantial number of heterosexual
marriages being in danger of dissolution because of the private sexual activities of
homosexuals. 219
Judge Merhige observed, in conclusion, that the promotion of moral-
ity and decency, cited by the majority opinion as grounds for the
Virginia sodomy statute, is a "salutary" legislative goal, 22 0 but is
214. 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
215. Id. at n.2; namely, Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13.
216. Id. at 1203-04 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 1204 (Merhige, J., dissenting). Judge Merhige cites his own opinion in Lovisi v.
Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 625 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.) (en banc). cert,
denied, 97 S. Ct. 485 (1976) where he characterized the constitutional right to privacy as follows:
"It is not marriage vows which make intimate and highly personal the sexual behavior of human
beings. It is, instead, the nature of sexuality itself or something intensely private to the individual
that calls forth constitutional protection."
218. 403 F. Supp. at 1204 (Merhige, J., dissenting).




limited by the constitutional right to privacy when it leads to lim-
itations on personal consensual adult conduct in the home. 22'
Thus, the majority opinion in Doe, affirmed by the Supreme Court,
found that allegedly unnatural acts, even between consenting adults in
the privacy of their homes, are outside the protection of the constitu-
tional right to privacy. But, the analysis of this Article suggests that
these decisions are wrong. An understanding of the moral status and
weight of the constitutional right to privacy in the light of the
contractarian theory of justice herein described compels a conclusion
contrary to that of the Court. There are convincing moral and con-
stitutional reasons why putatively unnatural acts, of the kind involved
in Doe, should be accorded the protection of the constitutional right to
privacy.
1. The Unnatural and the Equal Liberty Principle
We begin with the opinions of Justices Harlan and Goldberg in Poe
v. Ullman222 and Griswold v. Connecticut,223 respectively, cited by the
district court in Doe as the foundation of its holding that the constitu-
tional right to privacy is limited to marital relationships and does not
include deviant sexual conduct. In fact, as Judge Merhige showed in
his dissent, later opinions have found the constitutional right to
privacy applicable in non-marital contexts. 224 If the right to privacy
extends to sex among unmarried couples or even to autoeroticism, it is
impossible to understand how in a principled way the Court could
decline to consider fully the application of this right to private,
consensual deviant sex acts.
The Court might distinguish between heterosexual and homosexual
forms of sexual activity; but could this distinction be defended ra-
tionally? At bottom, such a view must rest on the belief that homosex-
ual or deviant sex generally is unnatural. Under this view, the un-
natural would have to be excluded altogether from the scope of the
constitutional right to privacy just as the obscene is excluded from first
amendment protection. 225 However, an analysis of the application of
the notion of the "unnatural" to deviant sexual acts and an exam-
221. Id.
222. 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
223. 381 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
224. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (contraceptives and the unmarried); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 US. 557 (1969) (private use of
pornography); see notes 94-107 supra and accompanying text.
225. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), reaffd, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973). See Free Speech, supra note 5, for a criticism of these decisions.
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ination of the moral force of the constitutional right to privacy seems to
compel the clear and decisive rejection of such a view.
The term "unnatural," as we have dealt with it,2 26 means the
interruption or disruption of proper or essential function or purpose,
resulting in frustration, impairment, corruption or degradation. An
unnatural human act is one which involves a deviation from funda-
mental human nature, warping that nature into the evil or degraded
non-human-the animal, the demonic, the possessed, the alien.
The notion that private, sexually deviant acts between consenting
adults are unnatural rests on the Augustinian view that the only natural
function of human sexuality is procreation and that any other sexual
activity is the natural object of shame. 227 In this view, the use of
contraceptives, abortifacients, or pornography is unnatural,22 8 because
such practices tend to frustrate the essential connection between sexual
experience and procreation. Homosexual acts are supposed unnatural
on similar grounds. Thus, for example, Victorian physicians wrote of
the weak, scrofulous, and even monstrous children that resulted from
the use of contraceptives in the home; 229 homosexuality, similarly, was
perceived as a kind of distorting -nervous dis6rder. 230
But, the use of so imprecise a notion as that of the "unnatural" to
distinguish between those acts not protected by the constitutional right
to privacy and those which are so protected is clearly unacceptable.
The case where the constitutional right to privacy had its very origin
was one involving contraception-a practice which the Augustinian
226. See notes 24-54 supra and accompanying text.
227. See notes 68-72 supra and accompanying text.
228. See note 71 supra and accompanying text; see also note 51 supra and accompanying text.
State statutes condemning the public reference to, or sale of, contraceptives suggest that they are
either obscene or indecent. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.40 (1968). Consider also the
remarks of one court on the interpretation of the term "unnatural sexual act": "The sociological
and biological range of sex acts is almost infinite, going from so-called Freudian impulses, alleged
by some to exist in all human behavior, to the viewpoint that all sex acts which do not lead to the
production of offspring are unnatural. Disregarding these extreme viewpoints, it is yet apparent
that many sex acts which may be logically classified as unnatural have widespread acceptance
and frequent use. By way of example: Certain types of birth control are obviously unnatural;
also, the practice of artificial insemination . . . is obviously unnatural. Various types of sex acts
useful in or even required for medical diagnostic practices are equally unnatural. . . . [Sluch
things as intercourse within certain proscribed age limits . . . and, possibly in some states, even
miscegenation, are . . . unnatural." State v. Sharpe, I Ohio App. 2d 425, -, 205 N.E.2d
113, 114 (1965), cited with approval in Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 643 (Alas. 1969).
229. J. Haller & R. Hailer, The Physician and Sexuality in Victorian America 114-15 (1974).
230. The leading nineteenth century authority supposed homosexuality to be a degenerative
nerve disorder. See R. von Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis 286-350 (12th ed. New York
1950) (1st ed. Leipzig 1901).
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view would deem unnatural. Yet, the Court has apparently concluded
that the "unnaturalness" of contraception, or of abortion, is constitu-
tionally inadmissible and cannot limit the scope of the right to privacy.
The very origin of the right to privacy as a morally necessary constitu-
tional concept arose from the Court's just perception that the use of
the notion of the unnatural in limiting personal liberty in the sexual
area was inconsistent with basic constitutional values of personal
liberty.
The Court's implicit rejection of the view that contraception and
abortion are unnatural reflects a considered contemporary view. As a
general empirical matter, there is simply no evidence that these
practices are damaging 231 or that they somehow distort human nature.
On the contrary, people justly suppose that contraception, for exam-
ple, affords a humane and desirable way of regulating the conse-
quences of sexual activity. By such means, the use of sexuality in the
expression of love is sharply demarcated from the use of sexuality in
procreation, 232 thus desirably broadening the range of choices.
In considering the constitutional permissibility of allowing ma-
joritarian notions of the unnatural to justify limitations on the right to
privacy, the Court must take into account two crucial variables: (1) the
absence of evidence that these practices are, in any plausible sense to
which empirical evidence is relevant, unnatural; and (2) the growing
contemporary understanding that people should have the optimal
liberty to love. In particular, the Court, in the contraception and
abortion decisions, impliedly rejected the legitimacy of state adoption
of the classic Augustinian view of human sexuality. The enforcement
of majoritarian prejudices, without any plausible empirical basis,
could be independently unconstitutional as a violation of due process
rationality in legislation.233 To enforce such personal tastes in matters
involving fair access to love would violate a fundamental human right.
The moral theory of the Constitution, built as a bulwark against
231. Note the Court's concern in Roe v. Wade to show that prohibiting an abortion is in fact
damaging to women in quite specific ways. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
232. For a Catholic argument to this effect, see M. Valente, Sex: The Radical View of a
Catholic Theologian (1970).
233. See Justice Stewart's remark, in the context of the permissibility of isolating the harmless
mentally ill on the ground that they failed to conform to normal behavior: "One might as well ask
if the State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically unattractive or
socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the
deprivation of a person's physical liberty." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). But
see Chief Justice Burger's remark in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), that
state legislatures may rationally indulge in "unprovable assumptions" as to public morality, at
least so long as fundamental individual rights are not infringed. See Comment, The Constitution-
ality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 553, 582-83 (1976).
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"serious oppressions of the minor party in the community, ' '2" 4 requires
that such moral rights be upheld and protected against majoritarian
prejudices. Contractarian theory provides the moral basis for such
constitutional protections by its emphasis upon each person's moral
right to a greatest equal liberty, opportunity and capacity to love,
compatible with a like liberty, opportunity and capacity for all.
For the same reasons that notions of the unnatural are constitution-
ally inadmissible in the right to privacy decisions involving contracep-
tion,2 35 abortion, 236 and the use of pornography in the home, 2"37 these
ideas are also inadmissible in the constitutional assessment of laws
prohibiting forms of sexual deviance between consenting adults in
private. In general, there is no generally acceptable empirical evidence
that homosexuality is unnatural. Many cultures which may share in
the notion of the unnatural do not regard homosexuality as un-
natural. 238 Individuals within our culture, who may find certain
conduct unnatural (for example, torturing one's own children) have
argued that homosexuality is not unnatural on the basis of various
facts which the traditional view either did not know or understand. 239
For example, it is known that homosexual behavior takes place in the
animal world. This suggests that homosexuality is part of our mamma-
lian heritage of sexual responsiveness.240 Many societies (including
ancient Greece) have included or include homosexuality among legiti-
mate sexual conduct, and some prescribe it in the form of institutional
pederasty. 24 t With respect to exclusive homosexuals, there appears to
be no distinction between this group and the general population in
terms of symptoms of mental illness 242 or measures of self-esteem and
234. The Federalist No. 78, at 359 (Hallowell ed. 1857) (A. Hamilton).
235. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U S. 479
(1965).
236. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
237. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
238. See K. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle 213-16 (1974);
Ford & Beach, supra note 126, at 130-33; J. Henderson, The Maculate Muse: Obscene Language
in Attic Comedy 204-22 (1975); H. Licht, Sexual Life in Ancient Greece 307-498 (1971); . Money
& A. Ehrhardt, Man & Woman Boy & Girl 122-52 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Money &
Ehrhardt]; T. Vanggaard, Phallos 23-47 (1972).
239. See W. Churchill, Homosexual Behavior Among Males 267-68 (1971). Ford & Beach,
supra note 126, at 264-66; Kinsey-Male, supra note 55, at 659-60. Cf. Hoffman. supra note 43, at
98-111.
240. Ford & Beach, supra note 126, at 134-43, 257-59.
241. See sources cited in note 238 supra.
242. See, e.g., Hooker, The Adjustment of the Male Overt Homosexual. 21 J. of Projective
Techniques 18 (1957). In late 1973 the Board of Trustees of the American Psychiatric Association
(APA) decided to remove homosexuality from the list of mental diseases. N.Y. Times, Dec. 16,
1973, at 1, col. 1. The Board's action was approved by a general vote of the APA membership in
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self-acceptance.2 4 3 In general, apart from their sexual preference,
exclusive homosexuals are indistinguishable from the general popula-
tion.2 44 Finally, homosexual preference appears to be an adaptation of
natural human propensities to very early social circumstances of
certain kinds,2 4 5 so that the preference is settled, largely irreversi-
April, 1974. N.Y. Times, April 9, 1974, at 12, col. 4. The position there rejected receives Its
classic statement in I. Bieber, Homosexuality: A Psychoanalytic Study of Male Homosexuals
(1962). See also H. Hendin, The Age of Sensation ch. 4 (1975); C. Socarides, Beyond Sexual
Freedom ch. 7 (1975); R. Stoller, Perversion: The Erotic Form of Hatred (1975). This position has
now been repudiated largely on the ground that it is based only on those homosexuals who have
sought psychiatric help, many of whom suffer from neurotic symptoms, as do most patients who
seek psychiatric help (heterosexual or homosexual). Thus, from the class of neurotic homosexuals
who seek psychiatric help, the view argues fallaciously that all homosexuals are neurotic. See
Hoffman, supra note 43, at ch. 9. In fact, when correct scientific method is applied to test whether
homosexuals as a class exhibit neurotic symptoms, no evidence appears. Hooker, supra. Freud
himself well understood these distinctions. A 1935 letter to a distraught mother whose son's
homosexuality was so disturbing to her that she could not even bring herself to mention it, reads,
in pertinent part: "Homosexuality is assuredly no advantage, but it is nothing to be ashamed of,
no vice, no degradation; it cannot be classified as an illness; we consider it to be a variation of the
sexual function .... Many highly respectable individuals of ancient and modern times have been
homosexuals, several of the greatest men among them. . . . It is a great injustice to persecute
homosexuality as a crime-and a cruelty too ....
"By asking me if I can help you, you mean, I suppose, if I can abolish homosexuality and make
normal heterosexuality take its place ....
"What analysis can do for your son runs in a different line. If he is unhappy, neurotic, torn by
conflicts, inhibited in his social life, analysis may bring him harmony, peace of mind, full
efficiency, whether he remains homosexual or gets changed. ... Letters of Sigmund Freud,
1873-1939 at 419-20 (E. Freud ed. 1961). Thus in the absence of neurotic symptoms, Freud
regarded homosexuals as improper subjects for treatment. See also The Psychogenesis of a Case
of Homosexuality in a Woman, in 18 Standard Edition, supra note 55.
243. See M. Weinberg & C. Williams, Male Homosexuals 148-49 (1974),
244. See W. Churchill, Homosexual Behavior Among Males 36-59 (1971).
245. The origin of homosexual preference is unclear. Some experimental studies claim to
adduce evidence that sexual preference is genetically determined. See D. West, Homosexuality
169 (1967) [hereinafter cited as West]. These studies, however, are now given little credence. See
C. Berg & C. Allen, The Problem of Homosexuality 41 (1958); B. Oliver, Sexual Deviation in
American Society 126 (1967); Sex Information and Education Council of the United States,
Sexuality and Man 78-80 (1970). The theory that homosexuality is due to hormonal imbalance has
been rejected. Berg & Allen, supra, at 41; Ford & Beach, supra note 126, at 236-37; Money &
Ehrhardt, supra note 238, at 235-44; Oliver, supra, at 126; West, supra, at 155-60. The
prevailing view now seems to be that homosexual preference results, not from inborn physical
characteristics, but from experiences during the individual's lifetime. West, supra, at 262. See
also Oliver, supra, at 126. One psychoanalytic explanation of male homosexuality suggests that it
results from a parent-child relationship that includes a seductive, over-attached, domineering
mother and a detached, hostile or remote father. I. Bieber, Homosexuality: A Psychoanalytic
Study of Male Homosexuals 310-13 (1962). Other explanations focus on more general social
experience, rejecting the crucial significance of parent-child relationships of these kinds. C.
Tripp, The Homosexual Matrix chs. 4-5 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Tripp]. The increasing weight
of modern evidence points to the importance of very early social experience. See Hoffman, supra
note 43, at 112-27; Money & Ehrhardt, supra note 238, at 153-201. Thus, one study hypothesizes
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bly,246 at a quite early age.
The cumulative impact of such facts is clear. The notion of "un-
natural acts," interpreted in terms of a fixed concept of proper sexual
functioning, deviations from which result in damage or degradation, is
not properly applied to homosexual acts performed in private between
consenting adults. Such activity is clearly a natural expression of
human sexual competences and sensitivities, and does not reflect any
form of damage, decline or injury.2 47 To deny the acceptibility of
that gender identity and sexual object choice coincide with the development of language, i.e.,
from 18-24 months of age. See Money, Hampson & Hampson, An Examination of Some Basic
Sexual Concepts: The Evidence of Human Hermaphroditism, 97 Bulletin of the Johns Hopkins
Hospital 301 (1955).
246. For the substantial irreversibility of sexual preference, see W. Churchill, Homosexual
Behavior Among Males 283-91 (1971); Tripp, supra note 245, at 251; West, supra note 245, at
266. Claimed cure rates by psychotherapists probably include instances in which the individual is
merely refraining from homosexual conduct while retaining his or her homosexual inclinations
and fail to indicate whether those alleged to be changed remained heterosexually oriented. W.
Barnett, Sexual Freedom and the Constitution 227 (1973). For a discussion of change techniques
employed by therapists, see L. Hatterer, Changing Homosexuality in the Male (1970).
247. See note 242 supra. One form of health problem, that might be adduced in this
connection, is venereal disease on the ground that it is common among homosexuals. See Fluker,
Recent Trends in Homosexuality in West London, 42 Brit. J. Venereal Diseases 48 (1966). In
fact, however, there is no necessary connection between homosexuality and the incidence of
venereal disease, and in any event, there is reason to believe that the incidence of venereal disease
among homosexuals has been fostered, not combatted, by prohibitory sodomy statutes. As
regards the incidence of venereal disease among homosexuals, two significant classes of homosex-
uals do not involve the venereal disease problem: (1) lesbians do not in general suffer from
venereal disease, in that women "practically never become infected except through contact with
men." G. Henry, All the Sexes 366 (1955); (2) stable homosexual relations, male and female, do
not implicate the disease. In general, the root of the venereal disease problem among homosexuals
arises from isolated, promiscuous relations among male homosexuals. M. Hoffman, The Gay
World 168 (1968); Jackson, Syphilis: The Role of the Homosexual, 19 Med. Services J. Canada
631, 634 (1963); Schofield, Social Aspects of Homosexuality, 40 Brit. J. Venereal Diseases 129,
131-32 (1964), not from the form of anal and oral intercourse. Homosexual Practices and Venereal
Diseases, 1964 Lancet 481. But, promiscuity among homosexuals probably is fostered by absolute
prohibitions on all forms of homosexual relations and concomitant forms of economic and social
discrimination. Since any form of stable homosexual relationship is easily identified as a form of
criminal activity, homosexuals are often driven into furtive, anonymous affairs where they suffer
less risk of identification. See note 272 infra and accompanying text. See also Jefferiss, Venereal
Disease and the Homosexual, 32 Brit. J. Venereal Diseases 17, 20 (1956); Schofield, supra, at 131.
These prohibitions also contribute to the incidence of venereal disease among homosexuals by
making it more difficult for them to seek treatment or proper diagnosis. Diagnostic difficulties in
identifying venereal disease among homosexuals would be lessened if homosexuals were not
inhibited by such laws from disclosing their sexual orientation to their physician. See Nicol,
Homosexuality and Venereal Disease, 184 The Practitioner 345, 349 (1960); Trice & Clark,
Transmission of Venereal Diseases Through Homosexual Practices, 54 S. Med. J. 76, 79 (1961);
Trice, Homosexual Transmission of Venereal Diseases, 88 Medical Times 1286 (1960). Efforts to
trace venereal disease are also inhibited by the inability of a homosexual engaging in anon)mous
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such love is itself a human evil, a denial of the distinctive capacities of
human nature for sensual and loving experience-in short, in a plausi-
ble sense, itself unnatural.
As we have seen,248 the application of the term "unnatural acts" to
sexual deviance grew out of Plato's twin arguments: (1) that male
homosexual relations involved the loss of desirable character traits
(e.g., courage and temperance); and (2) that human sexuality has one
proper form, namely, procreation. We have already discussed at length
the misconceptions underlying the procreational model.249
The view that male homosexuality necessarily involves the loss of
desirable character traits probably rests on the idea that sexual rela-
tions between males involve the degradation of one or both parties to
the status of a woman, assumedly a degraded thing to be. 250 But, this
view rests on intellectual confusion and unacceptable moral premises
since it confuses sexual preference with gender identity, whereas, in
fact, there is no correlation at all between them. Male homosexuals or
lesbians may be quite insistent about their respective gender identities
and have quite typical "masculine" or "feminine" personalities. Their
homosexuality is defined only by their erotic preference for members of
the same gender. 25 1 The notion that women are degraded is morally
sex to identify his partner and by his reluctance to incriminate either himself or the partner.
Jefferiss, Homosexually Acquired Venereal Diseases, 42 Brit. J. Venereal Diseases 46 (1966);
Schofield, supra, at 133.
248. See notes 59-86 supra and accompanying text.
249. See notes 154-57, 227-47 supra and accompanying text.
250. See note 60 supra and accompanying text. This interpretation explains why lesbianism
was never comdemned with the force that male homosexuality was. The Old Testament
prohibitions clearly seem to be directed against men. See, e.g., note 62 supra. Note that
lesbianism carried far lighter penalties than did male homosexuality under later rabbinical law.
D. Bailey, supra note 62, at 61-63. For a similar view of the extreme condemnation of male
homosexuality, see J. McNeill, The Church and the Homosexual 83-87 (1976). The same has been
true under Christian religious law. Id. at 160-65. The thought seems to be that since women are
already degraded, they cannot be made much worse by having homosexual sex. Men, on tile
other hand, not being degraded, degrade themselves by acting like women in having sex with
men. The underlying thought is expressed universally among primitive peoples by tile idea that
women have status inferior to men, since they are passive, autochthonous creatures subject to the
rhythms of nature, including uncontrollable and polluting menstrual flows and the burden of
bearing and raising children. See Rosaldo, Woman, Culture, and Society: A Theoretical Over-
view in Woman, Culture, and Society 17-42 (Rosaldo & Lamphere eds. 1974); Chodorow, Family
Structure and Feminine Personality, in id. at 43-66; Ortner, Is Female to Male as Nature is to
Culture?, in id. at 67-87. A woman's place, in this view, is defined by her limited nature. To
depart from this pattern is literally unnatural. This thought has found expression among
primitive peoples in the idea that deviational women are witches. See Rosaldo & Lamphere,
supra, at 34, 38, 86, 290-91. See also E. Janeway, Man's World, Woman's Place 119-33 (1971).
251. See, e.g., Simon & Gagnon, Feminity in the Lesbian Community, in Sexual Deviance
and Sexual Deviants 256-67 (E. Goode & R. Troiden eds. 1974).
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repugnant to contemporary jurisprudence 2- 2 and morality. 253 If such
crude and unjust sexual stereotypes lie at the bottom of anti-
homosexuality laws, they should be uprooted, as is being done else-
where in modern life. 254
In our culture, as we have seen, 25 5 the procreational model of
human sexuality has been in large part fostered by religious groups; for
example, the religious influence on the origin of laws prohibiting
"crimes against nature" is apparent. 25 6 Thus, the opinion of the district
court in Doe cites the Old Testament prohibitions as part of the
ancient history behind the Virginia sodomy statute. 25 7 In fact, as
previously noted, 258 there is growing controversy within religious
groups as to the proper interpretation of these and other Biblical
prohibitions. This tradition of rational theology, including attacks by
Catholic theologians on the procreational model of sexuality,2 59 indi-
cates that even the religious foundations on which these laws were
constructed are now seen to be jerrybuilt.
No doubt, however, some religious groups in our society will
continue to condemn homosexuality as unnatural, just as they continue
to so regard, for example, contraception. 260 Such people acknowledge
a religious duty to procreate, believing that any use of sexuality
252. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 329 (1971) (en banc). See generally L. Kanowitz, Women and the Law (1969). On the need
for a constitutional amendment to accelerate judicial and legislative developments, see Equal
Rights for Women: A Symposium on the Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 6 Harv. Civ.
Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 215 (1971); Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights
Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women. 80 Yale L.J. 871 (1971); Note,
Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?. 84 Harv.
L. Rev. 1499 (1971). For judicial developments regarded by some as unsatisfactory, see General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Geduldig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See generally Johnston, Sex
Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 617 (1974)
253. See S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (1952); E. Janewav, Man's World, Woman's Place
(1971); J. Mill, The Subjection of Women (1869); V. Woolf, A Room of One's Own (1929); Moral
Criticism, supra note 5, at ch. IV, pt. III.
254. See sources cited in note 252 supra.
255. See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text.
256. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
257. 403 F. Supp. at 1202 n.2. Such citation of Old Testament texts in support of the intrinsic
evil of homosexuality is common in American judicial opinions. See, e.g., Dawson v. Vance, 329
F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Tex. 1971), which cites the Sodom and Gomorrah episode at Genesis 19 in
support of the proposition that the "practice is inherently inimical to the general integrity of the
human person." Id. at 1322.
258. See notes 62 & 63 supra and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., M. Valente, Sex: The Radical View of a Catholic Theologian (1970)
260. For an account of the Catholic tradition regarding the unnaturalness of contraception,
see J. Noonan, Contraception 238-57 (1965).
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without the intention and likelihood of procreation is unnatural. These
people have a moral right to govern their own personal lives in accord
with their views. However, the imposition of their conception of
sexuality on society at large is not based on generally acceptable
empirical grounds, and thus they cannot justly, compatible with the
constitutional right to privacy, demand and require that others, who
do not share their views, deprive themselves of sexual expression and
love in the only way that they may be able to feel it. That their views
are based on religious perceptions, not mere personal whim, should not
allow them to enforce their views on others. Indeed, to the contrary, to
the extent their views rest solely on religious perceptions, not accessible
to ordinary empirical investigation, the enforcement of their views
violates not only the constitutional right to privacy 261 but the estab-
lishment of religion clause of the first amendment. 262
There is no logically consistent explanation for the Court's refusal to
enforce concepts of the "unnatural" in the case of contraception while
permitting statutes based on similar concepts to prohibit sexual de-
viance. Indeed, the moral arguments in the latter case are more
compelling. For one thing, statutes condemning and prohibiting forms
of contraception probably no longer reflected a majoritarian under-
standing of the unnaturalness of this form of birth control when they
were struck down in Griswold.263 Accordingly, the need for constitu-
tional protection, while proper, was not perhaps exigent. 264 However,
in the case of homosexuality, there is good reason to believe that, as a
group, homosexuals are subject to exactly the kind of unjust social
hatred which constitutional guarantees were designed to combat.265
261. See text accompanying note 165 supra.
262. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Barnett, supra note 75, at 74-93; Henkin,
Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 391 (1963).
263. In Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), the predecessor case to Griswold, a main reason
for judicial abstention was Justice Frankfurter's view that lack of enforcement of the Connecticut
contraception law evinced complete lack of belief in the law by enforcement officials and the
citizenry of Connecticut. See Least Dangerous, supra note 22, at 143-56.
264. See Least Dangerous, supra note 22.
265. Like racial and ethnic minorities, exclusive homosexuals constitute a quite small
percentage of the nation's population. Kinsey stated that 37 per cent of the total male population
has had some overt homosexual experience and that 4 per cent of white males are exclusively
homosexual throughout their lives. Kinsey-Male, supra note 55, at 650-51. Kinsey's figures may
even overestimate the incidence of male homosexuality. See 21 Playboy, Mar. 1974, at 54-55. No
major party has yet espoused the rights of homosexuals. American popular and legal attitudes
toward homosexuals derive from traditional Christianity's abhorrence of homosexuality, which
took the form of making homosexuality a capital offense. See notes 64-80 supra and accompany-
ing text. The cases are replete with expressions of judges' general revulsion with homosexuality
See, e.g., Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1039 (1970); In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); H. v. H., 59 N.J. Super. 227,
237, 157 A.2d 721, 727 (1959); In re Schmidt, 56 Misc. 2d 456, 460, 289 N.Y.S.2d 89, 92 (Sup.
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Presumably, the naturalness of homosexual experience would not in
itself legitimize such experience. Many forms of murder, for example,
are quite natural human occurrences, yet we do not regard them for
that reason any less properly criminally punishable. But, we have
argued not only that homosexual acts are natural, but that they may
involve the liberty to love which must, within limits, be morally and
constitutionally guaranteed. Indeed, the anti-homosexuality laws in-
volve a more severe incursion on this liberty than that at issue in the
other right to privacy cases. Contraception, abortion, and pornography
laws2 66 do not forbid sexual intimacy altogether; anti-sodomy laws
forbid certain forms of the expression of love completely.
Thus, we have argued that the concept of love is marked by certain
characteristic ends, beliefs and experiences-for example, the desire
for physical and psychological closeness, the desire to give pleasure to
the other, and the like. Such ends, beliefs and experiences are compat-
ible with a wide and indeterminate class of forms of physical expres-
sion, regardless of whether the expression is homosexual or heterosex-
ual. To suppose that only heterosexual sex can be love is to suppose
that love has a kind of canonical physical form. But as we have seen
this view is based on conceptual confusion, which leads here to moral
error.
The term "unnatural acts" may no doubt properly be applied to
some kinds of sexual acts, but homosexual acts are not among them.
Once the deathly pall of the unnatural is lifted from homosexuality, the
concept of love can no longer be limited to parties of different genders,
and we may thus perceive the prohibition of homosexuality as the
moral wrong it is.
The depth of the injustice that these prohibitions inflict can be seen
in terms of their effects upon exclusive homosexuals and their right to
fair access to self-respect. First, laws prohibiting homosexual conduct
inhibit persons inclined toward this form of sexual activity from
obtaining sexual satisfaction in the only way they find natural.2 67
Second, these laws probably encourage blackmail by providing a
means by which homosexuals can be threatened with exposure and
prosecution. Such vulnerability to blackmail may discourage employ-
ers from hiring homosexuals, on the ground that they are security
risks. 268 Third, laws prohibiting consensual adult homosexual activity
Ct. 1968). Not surprisingly, empirical surveys confirm the attitudes expressed or commented on in
judicial opinions. Fifty per cent of respondents in one study, all "from large cities in the United
States agree 'very much' that homosexuality is obscene and vulgar." M. Weinberg & C. Williams,
Male Homosexuals 84 (1974).
266. See notes 189-91 supra and accompanying text.
267. See note 322 infra.
268. Note, Security Clearances for Homosexuals, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 403, 409-11 (1973)
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provide a ground for discrimination against people of homosexual
preference in employment, housing, and public accommodation. 26 9
The cumulative effect of such laws accordingly is to deprive
homosexuals of the experience of a secure self-respect in their compe-
tence in building personal relationships. The degree of emotional
sacrifice thus exacted for no defensible reason seems among the most
unjust deprivations that law can compel. 270 Persons are deprived of a
realistic basis for having confidence and security in their most basic
emotional propensities. Criminal penalty, employment risks, and social
prejudice converge to render dubious a person's most spontaneous
native sentiments--dividing emotions, physical expression and self-
image in a cruelly gratuitous way.27' The deepest damage is spiritual.
A person surrounded by false social conceptions supported by law,
finds it difficult to experience self-esteem in his emotional propensities
and their natural expression. Without such self-esteem love lacks
foundation and physical desire, wayward and restless, finds no mean-
ingful or enduring object. Instead of being ensured fair access to love,
the homosexual's capacity to express such feelings is driven into a
secretive and concealed world of shallow and often anonymous physi-
cal encounters. 272 The achievement of emotional relationships of any
depth or permanence is made a matter of heroic individual effort when
it could, like heterosexual relations, be part of the warp and woof of
ordinary social possibility and opportunity. 273 In thus forbidding ex-
clusive homosexuals to express sexual love in the only way they
naturally can, the law deprives them of the good in life that love
affords. 274
269. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1973, § 4, at 5, col. 1. Engaging in any homosexual activity
still conclusively bars an individual from admission to the military. R. Mitchell, The Homosexual
and the Law 49-50 (1969). Some courts have allowed a general presumption that homosexuality
per se makes one unfit for government service. See Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372, 1378
(Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970). But cf. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C
Cir. 1969); Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on other grounds,
491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., I Cal.
3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969). See Comment, The Dwindling Rights of Teachers
and the Closing Court House Door, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 511, 524-26 (1975).
270. See generally H. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality 22 (1963); G. Weinberg, Society and
the Healthy Homosexual 78-82, 142-43 (1972).
271. See generally M. Hoffman, supra note 43. For an account of the damaging effects of
prejudice on the self-conception of the group discriminated against, see G. Allport, The Nature of
Prejudice ch. 9 (1958).
272. See L. Humphreys, Tearoom Trade 1-15 (1970); Hoffman, supra note 43; note 247,
supra.
273. See Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 Yale L.J. 573 (1973). But cf. Jones
v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185
(1971).
274. See notes 146-54 supra and accompanying text.
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In terms, then, both of the lack of empirical evidence for applying
the label "unnatural acts" to sexual deviance and the intrusion upon
individuals' right to love and self-respect, we can see that the perfor-
mance of such so-called "unnatural acts" involved in Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney for City of Richmond2 75 should fall within the
protection of the constitutional right to privacy articulated in earlier
case law. The district court in Doe erred both in failing adequately to
take into account the implications of the post-Griswold Supreme Court
privacy cases, and in failing even to note that the issue before it
merited the most exacting constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court,
in summarily affirming this clearly erroneous opinion, failed to develop
underlying constitutional values in a rationally or morally defensible
way. Indeed, by neither hearing oral argument nor writing an opinion
on an issue so significant to the preservation of the fundamental
constitutional rights of minorities, the Court failed not only to do
justice, but even to explain itself in a way that minimal due process
should require in a case of such importance.
2. Equal Liberty and the Protection
of Moral Standards
We see, then, that private, consensual homosexual acts between
adults deserve to fall within the protection of the constitutional right to
privacy and should be accorded whatever protection is given other
forms of love. The relevant constitutional question, therefore, is
whether statutory restrictions on putatively unnatural acts, such as
those upheld in Doe, are compatible with the underlying constitutional
principles of greatest equal liberty, opportunity and capacity to love,
consistent with a like liberty, opportunity and capacity for all.
Initially, it is important to be clear how the principle of love as a
civil liberty is to be understood. In deriving the principle, we observed
that the value of autonomous capacities in matters of love turned on
the existence of developed capacities of rational choice. Thus, the
principle is not intended to apply to persons presumably lacking
rational capacities, such as children. Nor, is there any objection to the
reasonable regulation of obtrusive sexual solicitations or, of course, to
forcible forms of intercourse of any kind.
In addition, we noted that the scope of the principle of love as a civil
liberty is limited by other moral principles that would be accepted in
the original position, for example: principles of not killing, harming or
inflicting gratuitous cruelty; principles of paternalism in narrowly
defined circumstances; and principles of fidelity.2 76 Thus, we have
275. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge court). aff'd without opinion. 425 U S.
901 (1976).
276. See notes 167-69 supra and accompanying text.
1977] 1333
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
formulated the relevant moral and constitutional principles to permit
some reasonable, legitimate restrictions on complete individual free-
dom. The Supreme Court in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton27
7
confirmed this view when it held that the constitutional right to
privacy did not require that consenting adults have access to obscene
materials in a movie house. Whatever may be the correctness of Paris
as an interpretation of the relation of obscenity law and the first
amendment, 278 it correctly emphasized that the values of the constitu-
tional right to privacy are largely concerned with the special status of
the home as a sanctuary for intimate emotions and relationships. 279
This Article is at one with the Court's rejection of the view that the
law should have no role in enforcing moral principles.280 However,
this leaves open the question of whether the Court in Doe correctly
construed its own principles, i.e., whether statutes of the kind upheld
in Doe can be justified by any of the principles qualifying the principle
of love as a civil liberty, recalling, as we must, that any restriction
upon liberty must be justified on the basis of facts ascertainable by
generally acceptable empirical methods.
Statutes such as that considered in Doe which absolutely prohibit
deviant sexual acts cannot be justified consistently with the principles
just discussed. For example, such statutes are not limited to forcible or
public forms of sexual intercourse, or to sexual intercourse by or with
children. They extend to private, consensual acts between adults as
well. To say that such laws are justified by their indirect effect of
stopping homosexual intercourse by or with the underaged would be as
absurd as to claim that absolute prohibitions on heterosexual inter-
course could be similarly justified. There is no reason in general to
believe that homosexuals as a class are any more involved in offenses
with the young than heterosexuals. 28' Nor is there any reliable evi-
dence that such laws inhibit children from being naturally homosexual
277. 413 U.S. 49, 57, 66 (1973).
278. See Free Speech, supra note 5.
279. See note 132 supra.
280. See On Liberty, supra note 132, at 185.
281. See P. Gebhard, J. Gagnon, W. Pomeroy, and C. Christenson, Sex Offenders (1965);
Hoffman, supra note 43, at 89-92. Analysis of imprisonment statistics of homosexuals sometimes
shows high percentages of arrests for offenses against children. See, e.g., C. Berg, Fear,
Punishment, Anxiety and the Wolfenden Report 33-34 (1959). Cf. R. Mitchell, The Homosexual
and the Law 11 (1969). However, these higher percentages probably simply reflect the fact that
homosexuals who molest children are far more frequently apprehended than homosexual people
who engage only in consensual relations with adults. The failure to note the distinction between
homosexuality and pedophilia is deplored by the majority of homosexual people who "do not
share, do not approve, and fear to be associated with pedophiliac interests," West, supra note 245,
at 119. On the impropriety of forbidding adults access to obscene books on the ground that access
to such books harms children, see Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
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who would otherwise be naturally heterosexual. As has been noted,
sexual preference generally is settled, largely irreversibly, in very early
childhood well before laws of this kind could have any effect. 282 If the
state has any legitimate interest in determining the sexual preference of
its citizens,2 83 that interest cannot constitutionally be secured by
overbroad statutes which tread upon the rights of exclusive homosexu-
als and which, in any event, irrationally pursue the claimed interest,
which could be effected only by state intervention in quite early stages
of child rearing. 284
Other moral principles which might qualify the principle of equal
liberty to love also fail to justify absolute prohibitions on consensual
sexual deviance. Homosexual relations, for example, are not in general
violent. Thus, prohibitory statutes could not be justified by moral
principles of nonmaleficence. 285 There is no convincing evidence that
homosexuality is either harmful to the homosexual or correlated with
any form of mental or physicial disease or defect. 286 To the contrary,
there is evidence that anti-sodomy laws, which either force homosexu-
als into forms of heterosexual marriage which are unnatural for
them 287 or otherwise distort and disfigure the reasonable pursuit of
natural emotional fulfillment,2 88 harm homosexuals and others in deep
and permanent ways. Accordingly, principles of legitimate state pater-
nalism do not here come into play.
One quite relevant set of facts which would justify prohibitions of
homosexuality, would be empirical support for the view that homosex-
uality is a kind of degenerative social poison and natural catastrophe,
leading directly to disease, social disorder, and even natural disaster,
as, for example, Justinian supposed in condemning homosexuality as
a capital offense. 289 As we have observed, principles of justice must be
compatible with the stability of institutions of social cooperation. In
particular, the principle of greatest equal liberty would not extend to
forms of liberty that are incompatible with stable social cooperation.
Thus, if the above allegations regarding homosexuality were true, the
existence of homosexuality might justly be prohibited on the ground
282. See note 245 supra.
283. It is not at all self-evident that it has such a constitutionally legitimate interest. See
generally Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923), which question the propriety of certain types of state regulation of the education of
children.
284. See note 245 supra.
285. See R. Mitchell, The Homosexual and the Law 12 (1969). In fact, there is evidence that
homosexuals are less violent than heterosexuals. See Hoffman, supra note 43. at 90-91.
286. See note 242 supra.
287. See note 322 infra and accompanying text.
288. See notes 265-74 supra and accompanying text.
289. See note 66 supra.
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that it would undermine the entire constitutional order of equal
liberties, so that justice on balance would be secured by the prohibition
of these acts. However, these beliefs are quite untenable today. Many
nations, including many in Western Europe, 290 have long allowed
homosexual acts between consenting adults with no consequent social
disorder, disease, disruption or the like. England recently legalized
such acts with no untoward results. 291
One final argument has been supposed to justify a general prohi-
bition upon homosexuality-the argument for preserving moral stan-
dards, invoked by the district court in Doe as "the promotion of
morality and decency. ' 292 That court believed this to be the ultimate
ground for the legitimacy of the Virginia sodomy statute. The argu-
ment takes two forms: (1) a general jurisprudential thesis about the
relation of law and morals, and (2) an interpretation of the moral
principles qualifying the principle of love as a civil liberty. Neither
view can be sustained.
The classic modern statement of the jurisprudential thesis was made
by Devlin2 93 against Hart,294 repeating many of the arguments earlier
made by Stephen295 against Mill. 296 The Devlin-Hart debate centered
on the jurisprudential interpretation of the Wolfenden Report,2 9 7
which recommended, inter alia, the abolition of the imposition of
criminal penalties for homosexual acts between consenting adults.
Devlin, in questioning the Report, focused on the proposition that
certain private immoral acts are not the law's business. The criminal
law, Devlin argued, is completely unintelligible without reference to
morality, which it enforces. Thus, for example, the fact that two
parties agree to kill one another does not relieve the killer of criminal
liability, for the act in question is immoral. The privacy of the act is
irrelevant. Similarly, the criminal law in general arises from morality.
Morality, Devlin maintains, is the necessary condition of the existence
of society. Thus, to change the law in such a way as to violate that
morality is to threaten the stability of the social order. Morality, in this
connection, is to be understood in terms of the ordinary man's intuitive
sense of right and wrong, as determined, Devlin suggests, by taking a
man at random from the Clapham omnibus. Just as we prove the
290. See Barnett, supra note 75, at 293, 305-07.
291. Sexual Offenses Act, 1967, c. 60.
292. 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
293. Devlin, supra note 74.
294. See H. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (1963).
295. J. Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity 135-78 (1967).
296. J. Mill, On Liberty, supra note 132, at 271-93.
297. Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution, Report Cmnd. No.




standards of negligence for purposes of civil or criminal liability by
appealing to the judgment of ordinary men acting as jurors, so the
applicable standards of morality can be proved in the same way.
Ordinary men morally loathe homosexuality; accordingly, homosexual-
ity is immoral and must be legally forbidden.
Superficially, Devlin's argument appears to have the general form of
an acceptable constitutional argument. There should be no constitu-
tional objection to prohibiting clearly immoral acts which threaten the
existence of society. Further, it is surely very plausible that law and
morals have a deep and systematic connection of the kind Devlin
suggests. 2 98 However, these abstractly plausible propositions will not
support the specific argument which Devlin propounds. Devlin argues,
probably correctly, that the criminal law arises from morality, which it
enforces. But he then falsely identifies morality with conventional
social views in a way which renders unthinkable, if not unintelligible,
the whole idea of moral criticism and the reform of social convention.
Adoption of this view would effectively freeze the measure of legally
enforceable moral ideas into a possibly quite ephemeral interim victory
of one set of contending ideological forces over another.2 99 But there is
no good reason to make this identification of morality and social
convention, since it is based on an indefensible and naive moral
philosophy as well as an unexamined and unsound sociology. 30 0
Recent moral philosophy has been increasingly occupied with the
clarification of the conceptual structure of ordinary moral reasoning. 30 1
The concept of morality or ethics is not an openly flexible one; there
are certain determinate constraints on the kind of beliefs that can be
counted as moral in nature. 30 2 Some examples are the principles of
mutual respect-treating others as you would like to be treated in
comparable circumstances; 30 3 universalization-judging the morality of
298. Cf. Action, supra note 24, at chs. 7-10.
299. See Gussfeld, On Legislating Morals: The Symbolic Process of Designating Deviancy, 56
Calif. L. Rev. 54, 58-59 (1968).
300. See Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. Chi. L Rev I
(1967).
301. See K. Baler, The Moral Point of View 187-213 (1958); D. Gauthier, Practical Reasoning
(1963); G. Grice, The Grounds of Moral Judgment 1-35 (1967); R. Hare, The Language of Morals
(1952); R. Hare, Freedom and Reason 86-185 (1963); Rawls, supra note 134; Action, supra note
24.
302. See G. Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy 55-61 (1967); G. Warnock, The
Object of Morality 35-70 (1971); Foot & Harrison, When Is a Principle a Moral Principle?, 28
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95-134 (1954); Foot, Moral Arguments, 67 Mind 502-13
(1958); Foot, Moral Beliefs, 59 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 83-104 (1958-1959).
303. See K. Baier, The Moral Point of View 187-213 (1958); D. Gauthier, Practical Reasoning
81-94 (1963); G. Grice, The Grounds of Moral Judgment 1-35 (1967); Rawls, supra note 134, at
130-32; Action, supra note 24, at 75-91.
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principles by the consequences of their universal application; 3 4 and
minimization of fortuitous human differences (like clan, caste, ethnic-
ity and color) as a basis for differential treatment. 30 5 It follows from
this conception that a view is not a moral one merely because it is
passionately and sincerely held, or because it has a certain emotional
depth, 30 6 or because it is the view of one's father or mother or clan, or
because it is conventional. On the contrary, the moral point of view
affords an impartial way of assessing whether any of these beliefs,
which may often press one to action, is in fact worthy of ethical
commitment. 307
Thus, moral views of the kind that the law enforces do not rest on
mere social convention. Rather, as we have said, moral questions are
marked by a special, universalizing kind of reasoning. For example,
the view that non-remedial preferential quotas are immoral rests on a
principle which a morally aware person would defend whether he was
helped or hurt by it. 30 8 Whatever the adequacy of the contract model
of moral principles employed in this Article, it at least attempts to take
these features of moral reasoning seriously. Devlin's theory, if it can be
so called, does not; it is based on quite non-moral instincts, social
tastes and accepted conventions. It is a mark of the unhappy separa-
tion of legal theory from serious moral theory that Devlin's superficial
analysis can have been taken so seriously when its moral basis is so
transparently inadequate.
Devlin's theory is not, however, merely theoretically unsatisfactory.
If it were accepted, it would be morally repelling in its conclusions. It
would elevate all forms of social prejudice, even though unsupported
by intelligible moral reasoning of any kind (indeed, intransigently
resistant to critical moral scrutiny), 30 9 into moral bases for law. It
would thus undermine the entire notion of rational due process of law,
304. See R. Hare, Freedom and Reason 91-94 (1963); Action, supra note 24, at 83-85, 216.
305. This idea is the basis of Kant's theory of autonomy. See I. Kant, Foundations of the
Metaphysics of Morals 65-71 (L. Beck trans. 1959). Also note J.S. Mill's remark that the true Idea
of distributive justice consists in "redressing the inequalities and wrongs of nature." J. Mill, 2
Principles of Political Economy 398 (1864). Mill thus concludes that primogeniture is unjust in
that distinctions are grounded on accident. Id. at 505. Note also Sidgwick's claim that justice
rewards voluntary effort, not natural ability alone. H. Sidgwick, The Principles of Political
Economy 505-06, 531 (1887).
306. Cf. Devlin, supra note 74, at 114: "What is important is not the quality of the creed but
the strength of the belief in it."
307. See sources cited in note 301 supra.
308. For examples of the force of this kind of reasoning, see R. Hare, Freedom and Reason
86-185 (1963).
309. See Barnett, Corruption of Morals-The Underlying Issue of the Pornography Commis-
sion Report, 2 Law & Soc. Order 189 (1971); Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of
Morals, 75 Yale L.J. 986 (1966).
1338 [Vol. 45
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
which requires that reasons be given in order to justify deprivations of
life, liberty or property. At bottom, it makes blind and possibly vicious
prejudice into the moral foundation of law. Instead of defending
people from passions born of ignorance, it simply makes those pas-
sions the measure of legally enforceable morality.
The attraction of Devlin's theory for judges is its seeming objectiv-
ity: it affords a definite criterion for the morality that the law enforces
without appeal to subjective considerations. 31 0 But the empirical ob-
jectivity of existing custom has nothing to do with the notions of moral
impartiality and objectivity which are, or should be, of judicial
concern in determining the public morality on which the law rests. The
idea that the pursuit of the latter must collapse into the former is a
confusion of inquiries, arising from an untenable and indefensible
distinction between subjective moral belief and the public morality of
the law. There is no such distinction. Views, to be moral, require a
certain kind of justification. Judges, in interpreting legally enforceable
moral ideas, must appeal to the kind of reasoning that is moral. They
do not as judges abdicate their capacity for moral reasoning as
persons. On the contrary, competence and articulateness in such
reasoning comprise the virtue that we denominate judicial.
Devlin's theory is for such reasons theoretically and practically
unacceptable. However, even if it could be defended on such grounds,
it must be rejected as it is incompatible with the moral theory implicit
in the constitutional order. The Constitution, we have argued, rests on
the idea that moral rights of individuals cannot be violated, notwith-
standing majoritarian sentiments to the contrary. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has rightly and consistently rejected arguments which
question constitutional rights on the basis of popular prejudices,
whether the prejudices are racial or sexual. 31 1 Such prejudices, so far
from being enforced, have been circumscribed in order to protect
constitutional liberties. 3 12
We have here argued that homosexual love comes within a constitu-
310. For the classic statement of this view by an American judge, see B. Cardozo, The
Nature of the Judicial Process 108-11, 112, 131, 136 (1949).
311. Historically, racial and sexual prejudices were interdependent; the inferiority of blacks
was used as a ground for arguments for the inferiority of women, and conversely. See G. Myrda,
An American Dilemma 1073-78 (1944); see also J. Haller & R. Haller, The Physician and
Sexuality in Victorian America 48-61 (1974); Slavery Defended (E. McKitrick ed. 1963). For
evidence of the psychological interrelationships of racial and sexual prejudice, see T. Adorno, E.
Frenkel-Brunswik, D. Levinson & R. Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality, 399-441, 452-54,
506-17, 866-72 (1950).
312. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) (contraception for unmarried persons); Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1 (1967) (miscege-
nation); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (segregated education). See also note 252 supra.
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tionally protected right, the right to privacy. The basis of this constitu-
tional right is a moral right, the right of maximum access to love. This
moral right rests on the thought that just as a mature person would not
want the form in which he or she feels and expresses love to be
regulated or prohibited, he or she should extend similar consideration
to others. Accordingly, so far from homosexuality being immoral, as
Devlin argued, it is immoral to prohibit it. Social attitudes to the
contrary, not being based on generally acceptable empirical facts, are
precisely forms of sexual prejudice and shibboleth from which people
should be protected. 313 To appeal to popular attitudes, in the way in
which Devlin does, in order to restrict the moral rights of the unpopu-
lar minority, is precisely to withhold the constitutional right to privacy
for the very reason it is most exigently needed.
Pursuing Devlin's line of thought, the district court in Doe argued
that "[i]f a State determines that punishment [for consensual adult
homosexual acts], even when committed in the home, is appropriate in
the promotion of morality and decency, it is not for the courts to say
that the State is not free to do so." 314 The majority opinion went on to
say that this ground does not require the state to show that immoral
consequences actually occur. All that need be shown is that "the
conduct is likely to end in a contribution to moral delinquency. " 31 5 In
support of this proposition, the court cited a case where fellatio among
a married couple and a third party involved distribution of pictures of
the said acts in school by the couple's daughters (aged 11 and 13). The
citation of a case of apparently heterosexual sodomy, involving clear
elements of a waiver of privacy rights3 16 as evidence for the propriety
of proscribing clearly private homosexual sex is a remarkable non-
sequitur, illustrating the kind of shabby reasoning to which courts are
driven in order to lend a shred of moral plausibility to these prohi-
bitions. The invocation of "morality and decency" 317 has here, as in
Devlin, the force of a circular appeal to social conventions which the
courts of the United States have a constitutional duty to review and
question in the light of applicable constitutional values which these
social conventions violate.
We see, then, that this general kind of argument for preserving
moral standards is objectionable in moral and constitutional principle.
There is, however, another form of the argument, which is not
313. On the force of these attitudes as prejudices, see G. Weinberg, Society and the Healthy
Homosexual 1-20 (1972).
314. 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
315. Id.
316. See Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 485 (1976).
317. 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
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similarly objectionable, resting, as it does, on an interpretation of the
moral principles restricting the principle of love as a civil liberty. The
district court in Doe employed such a mode of argument when it
suggested that the moral issue before it was not that homosexuality is
objectionable per se, but rather that in the present state of society it
tends to evade certain moral principles, for example, principles of
fidelity involved in heterosexual marriage and family obligations. 318
That court's use of the argument is, as we have seen, fundamentally
fallacious. There remains, however, the general intuition that homo-
sexuality, if allowed, would violate moral principles implicit in the
institution of the heterosexual family.
While this line of thought has the general form of an acceptable
moral and constitutional argument, its factual assumptions are utterly
unsupported by evidence. For example, the argument makes the
unsupported assumption that homosexuality would cause the decline
of heterosexual marriage. But, as Judge Merhige indicated in his
dissent in Doe, such a claim is so empirically flimsy as to be "unworthy
of judicial response. ' 319 For one thing, historical and contemporary
data show that homosexual connections are compatible with hetero-
sexual marriage. 320 The many countries which have legalized homo-
sexual relations show no decline in the rate of heterosexual marriage
as an institution. 32 1 It thus appears that prohibitions of homosex-
ual relations have no effect on heterosexual marriage.322
318. Id. Thus, Lovisi, on which the judge focused, involved both a breach of the traditional
marital bond (a threesome, two of whom are a married couple, engaging in fellatio) and elements
of degradation of the young (the children, aged 11 and 13, who distributed pictures of their
parents' activities in school).
319. 403 F. Supp. at 1205 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
320. For example, in ancient Greece and in many primitive societies, the preferred model was
homosexual relations and heterosexual marriage. See note 238 supra. The United States data
illustrates that this pattern still persists; homosexual and heterosexual relations can coexist in the
same person either at one time or over time. See Kinsey-Male, supra note 55, at 610-66.
321. See Barnett, supra note 75, at 293.
322. Some homosexuals, who are in fact exclusively homosexual, do marry and have
children. P. Wilson, The Sexual Dilemma 52-53 (1970). In general, those whose sexuality is
entirely homosexual can function heterosexually for periods of time. D. West, Homosexuality
233-34 (1961); Knight, Overt Male Homosexuality, in Sexual Behavior and the Law 442-43 (R.
Slovenko ed. 1965). By employing sexual fantasies of a person for whom they do experience erotic
feeling, people can thus have intercourse with people in whom they experience nothing erotic.
Note Kinsey's description of how people have intercourse with prostitutes they find unattractive:
"As far as his psychologic responses are concerned, the male in many instances may not be having
coitus with the immediate sexual partner, but with all of the other girls with whom he has ever
had coitus, and with the entire genus Female with which he would like to have coitus." A.
Kinsey, W. Pomeroy, C. Martin, & P. Gebhard, Sexual Behavior in the Human Female 684
(1953). In the case of exclusive homosexuals, the effect of thus frustrating natural feeling to
conform to conventional modes of conduct is probably to starve and waste resources of
spontaneous and individual human feeling. See note 162 supra and accompanying text.
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The intuition, regarding the connection of homosexuality, if al-
lowed, and the decline of the heterosexual family, is an ancient and
pervasive one. 323 One modern formulation of this notion which is
striking and suggestive is that it is not the mere occurrence in private
of consensual homosexual acts that results in any cognizable social
harm, but it is the way of life that exclusive homosexuality involves.
3 24
According to this view, consensual homosexual acts in private are not
of social concern, but the way of life that such sex acts exemplify is. To
legitimate these sex acts is to legitimate an undesirable way of life; thus
these sex acts, even in private between consenting adults, may justly
be prohibited.
It is important to inquire with care what. this intuitive allegation
amounts to, for a form of it bears the imprimatur of the Supreme
Court itself. 325 The suggestion, I believe, is this: Public knowledge of
the legitimacy of homosexual acts would undermine the capacity of
heterosexuals to sustain the way of life required for the monogamous
nuclear family and the personal sacrifices that such a way of life
requires. But no one in the Western cultural tradition could reasonably
claim that the existence of legitimate ways of life outside marriage
undermine social stability. The legitimacy of remaining unmarried has
not undermined the heterosexual family. Indeed, one form of the
legitimate state of being unmarried, religious celibacy, has long been
regarded as a sanctified state by influential Western religions; the fact
that celibacy is legitimate, and indeed is sanctified as a preferable
religious and moral ideal, has not made the heterosexual family less
stable.
Why, then, should the recognition of homosexuality as a legitimate
way of life be treated in a radically different way? The suggestion must
be that homosexual preference is so strong and heterosexual preference
so weak (and conventional family life so unattractive) that people
would tend not to undertake heterosexual marriage if homosexuality as
a way of life were legitimate. But, as we have seen, there is no shred of
empirical support for this view. Not only is exclusive heterosexual
preference much the majority view, but the attractions of heterosexual
In addition, there is growing evidence that heterosexual marriages of exclusive homosexuals
typically end unhappily for all concerned. One authority, for example, reports that one third of
the divorce cases he handled arose from the homosexuality of one of the parties. See J. McNelll,
The Church and the Homosexual 136 (1976).
323. See Plato's suggestion that the prohibition of homosexuality "wins men to affection of
their wedded wives." Laws, Book VIII, 839a. For commentary, see G. Grube, Plato's Thought
118-19 (1958).
324. See the development of this argument in the obscenity context in Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); for commentary thereon, see note 331 infra.
325. See Paris Adult Theatre I. v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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marriage are deep-seated and permanent features of the human condi-
tion. Human beings, generally raised in the nuclear heterosexual
family, naturally regard the cooperation and creative sharing which
typifies the heterosexual family as the answer, or part of the answer, to
the recurrent human problem of loneliness and isolation. For most
people, conventional marriage is and will long remain the standard
answer to the meaning of life-supplying a natural response to human
needs for sexual release, intimacy and the desire for permanence
(child-rearing). It is a bizarre underestimation of the attractions of
family life to suppose that the legitimacy of homosexuality as a way of
life would have any effect on it at all. Even in this era of growing
sexual freedom and rising div orce rates, there is no sign that
heterosexual marriage as an institution is in general less attractive. The
rising divorce rates show, not a distaste for marriage, but only less
willingness to stick with the original partners in marriage. The impor-
tant and striking feature of this phenomenon is that divorced people
typically remarry; they reject their previous partner, not the institution
of marriage itself. 326
The "way of life" argument, applied to the legitimization of
homosexuality, thus lacks empirical content, and must for its force rest
on a kind of hystericalized sexual fantasy regarding the pervasive and
deadly attractions of homosexual sex. That argument cannot be sus-
tained as an empirical proposition, even though it can be understood
as the psychological residue of fear and loathing unmistakably left by
the long tradition that condemned homosexuality and non-procreative
sex in general as unnatural. Thus, the intuition that legitimate
homosexuality will destroy the family is circular. It has or should have
no force independent of the empirical assumptions on which it rests.
Undoubtedly, residues of guilt and fear remain long after we reject on
rational grounds the beliefs on which those guilts and fears rest. But,
this psychological truth does not validate such regressive emotions as a
legitimate basis for law. If the life of reason requires us to circumscribe
such negative emotions as a basis for ethical conduct, the morality of
law can require no less. 327
In any event, it is difficult to understand how the state has the right,
on moral grounds, to protect heterosexual love at the expense of
homosexual love. Contractarian principles seem precisely to forbid the
kind of calculation that this sort of sacrifice contemplates. They forbid
the sacrifice of the fundamental interests of one group in order to
secure the greater happiness of other groups or of the whole. These
principles prescribe minimal benchmarks of human decency, resting on
326. See generally M. Bane, Here to Stay (1976).
327. Cf. Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 Yale L.J. 986 (1966);
see note 53 supra.
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boundary constraints respecting the interest of all persons equally in
general goods, which limit the power of majority rule to plough under
the interests of minorities.
In general, there is surely no constitutional or moral duty to marry
or, more generally, to procreate; such an idea violates everything that
the constitutional right to privacy was designed to protect, namely,
autonomy in deciding whether and how to love. People have children
for reasons tied up with their conceptions of personal happiness and
fulfillment; they perform no moral duty, nor are they morally admira-
ble, in having children. Indeed, in the present state of overpopulation,
many suppose and argue that there are moral duties not to procre-
ate. 328
Finally, there is reason to believe that the argument for protecting
marriage and the family is hypocritically proposed. If the argument
were meant seriously, state laws against fornication and adultery
would be vigorously pressed in addition to the anti-homosexuality laws.
But, in many states, such laws either do not exist or penalize
homosexuality much more severely than heterosexual offenses. 3 29 This
suggests what should by now be reasonably clear-that anti-
homosexuality laws rest not on rational arguments consistently pur-
sued, but on ancient prejudice and a vestige of ideas of unnatural
sexual witchcraft and demonology. 330
At bottom, the argument for preserving moral standards is circular.
It assumes that homosexuality is immoral and that prohibiting it
accordingly is moral. 331 But, we have argued that anti-homosexuality
328. For a discussion of the seriousness of the population problem, see M. Mesarovic & E.
Pestel, Mankind at the Turning Point, The Second Report to the Club of Rome 70-82 (1974); for a
discussion of the existence of moral duties to limit population, see Action, supra note 24, at
134-35.
In Custodio v. Bauer, the court cited Griswold for the proposition that the state could exercise
no legitimate limitation over a person's right to sterilization. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, ., 59
Cal. Rptr. 463, 472-73 (1967). Accordingly, the court allowed a broad measure of damages for the
failure of a doctor to perform his services adequately, including costs of the operation, costs of
pregnancy and birth, compensation for mental anguish, pain and suffering, and for the loss of the
mother's attention by others in the family. Id. at 323-26, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 576-78. Other courts
have followed the lead of Custodio, see, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616, 617-19 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1971) (damages); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. App. 1970) (theories of
liability); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 250-62, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518-21 (1971) (damages).
These cases have acknowledged Griswold as a source of a "constitutionally protected right not to
have children." Coleman v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616, 618 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (damages);
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 253-54, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (1971) (damages).
329. See statutes cited in Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosex-
ual Conduct, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 1613, 1622-23 nn. 63-67 (1974).
330. See generally R. Masters, Eros and Evil: The Sexual Psychopathology of Witchcraft
(1966). For the more general social significance of notions of witchcraft, see Witchcraft and
Sorcery (M. Marwick ed. 1970).
331. Two other forms of the argument from moral standards, both in the same way circular,
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laws violate the moral right of people to be treated as persons with fair
access to love and self-respect. So far from homosexuality being
immoral, the anti-homosexuality laws appear now themselves to be
unjust and immoral, perpetuating a traditional persecution, for that is
its proper name, built on indefensible prejudice.
are worthy of note. First, there is the argument made by Justice Burger in Paris Adult Theatre I.
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), invoking Professor Bickel's remarks to the effect that, to allow
people consensually to gather to view obscene materials, in a way not obtrusive on others, - 'is to
affect the world about the rest of us, and to impinge on other privacies (for] [elven supposing that
each of us can, if he wishes, effectively avert the eye and stop the ear (which, in truth, we
cannot), what is commonly read and seen and heard and done intrudes upon us all, want it or
not.' " Id. at 59, quoting Bickel, 22 Pub. Interest 25-26 (1971). Such an argument could easily be
applied to homosexual acts in private between consenting adults, to the effect that prohibitions of
such acts are based on the ground that they protect "other privacies."
It is doubtful, however, that the Court would apply the argument, at least in this form, to the
analysis of the constitutionality of anti-homosexuality laws, for as applied to such acts the
argument is more patently improper than it is as applied to obscenity. For a discussion of this
aspect of the Paris case, see Free Speech, supra note 5, at 85-87. As applied to consensual acts in
private between consenting adults, the argument takes the paradoxical form that permitting any
form of conduct, in fact disliked by many people in the society, violates the rights to privacy of
those who disapprove of the conduct. This seems to be an abuse of language and a perversion of
basic moral and constitutional values. For the argument amounts to nothing more than the claim
that the knowledge of certain disapproved conduct suffices wtthout more to justify the legal
prohibition of that conduct At bottom, the argument would rest on the crude confusion between
an obtrusive offense and the subjective offense derived from the mere knowledge of something. If
accepted, this view would dilute the constitutional right to privacy from the strong substantive
protection of individual autonomy that it is, to the empty and pale idea that people should be
allowed to do only that to which no one has any objection. Cf. H. Hart, Law, Uberty, and
Morality 46-47 (1963).
Second, the argument for protecting moral standards, as applied to anti-homosexuality laws,
may be posed in terms of advancing certain demonstrable moral virtues or character traits which
citizens of a stable constitutional democracy should have, but which homosexuals as a class lack.
But, again, the argument is circular: it identifies the virtues of democratic citizenship with a
certain narrowly defined sexual morality, and then assumes that homosexuals, as a class, are
morally vicious because they fail to conform to that morality. These assumptions will not
withstand critical examination. There is no reason whatsoever to identify the virtues of democra-
tic citizenship-public spiritedness, civil reponsibility, democratic tolerance, mutual respect-
with heterosexuality. Courts increasingly have acknowledged that the general assumption that
homosexuality per se renders one unfit for normal responsibilities is unfounded and unjust. See
Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843
(D. Md. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974);
Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969) (in bank).
See also Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Richardson v. Hampton, 345 F.
Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1972). Cf. Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S 118, 129
(1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting): "It is common knowledge that in this century homosexuals have
risen high in our own public service-both in Congress and in the Executive Branch-and have
served with distinction." Good citizenship is surely compatible with many sexual styles and
moralities. Indeed, one might suppose that the virtues of democratic tolerance and mutual respect
are fostered by practicing tolerance toward different sexual moralities and by insistence on
maintaining constitutional liberties, including the constitutional right to privacy, for all groups.
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Everyone praises love in our civilization; 33 2 but a particular form of
love between parties of the same gender, transmogrified unrecogniza-
bly by popular imagination from its simple nature into an unnatural
grotesquerie of degradation and exploitation, is thus made the butt of
social ridicule and the object of criminal penalty. The Supreme Court's
summary affirmance in Doe reflects popular imagination, abruptly
truncating the reach of constitutional values in the name of "unnatural
acts," which are excluded from the constitutional scrutiny otherwise
required. In Doe, the Court failed to develop constitutional values in a
reasonable way. Instead of showing how constitutional values, popu-
larly accepted in the area of contraception, equally apply to unjustly
hated minorities, the Court acquiesced in unexamined popular
bromides and shabby arguments unworthy of our constitutional tradi-
tion. IV. CONCLUSIONS
This Article has tried to show how an examination of moral and
philosophical theory can fundamentally clarify the constitutional right
to privacy. On the view presented here, the Supreme Court could not
have affirmed the decision of the district court in Doe had it given
precise thought to the nature of the unnatural and the force of the
moral theory behind the constitutional right to privacy.
We have not here discussed arguments, other than the constitutional
right to privacy, that can be used to attack these prohibitory stat-
utes; 333 nor have we discussed in proper detail the many constitutional
arguments that could be developed to protect sexual minorities in other
areas. 3 34 Certain of these arguments are weighty;3 35 others less 50.336
332. See note 255 supra.
333. The best general treatment and exposition of this range of constitutional arguments is
Barnett, supra note 75; see Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 Fordham L.
Rev. 553 (1976). But see Calvani, Book Review, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 965 (1974).
334. See generally Note, Dismissal of Homosexuals from Government Employment: The
Developing Role of Due Process in Administrative Adjudications, 58 Geo. L.J. 632 (1970); Note,
Government-Created Employment Disabilities of the Homosexual, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1738 (1969);
Note, Is Governmental Policy Affecting the Employment of Homosexuals Rational?, 48 N.C.L.
Rev. 912 (1970); Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 Yale L.J. 573 (1973). On
enforcement problems, see Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An
Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 643 (1966); Note, Private Consensual Homosexual Behavior: The Crime and its Enforce-
ment, 70 Yale L.J. 623 (1961).
335. The argument that sodomy statutes discriminate against homosexuals as a suspect class,
in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, seems to be an argument
of particular force. Moral Criticism, supra note 5, at ch. IV, pt. III; see Note, The Constitutional-
ity of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 1613, 1622 (1974).
336. The argument, for example, that criminal punishment of homosexual behavior violates
the eighth amendment, in violation of Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) and Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), seems weak. The compulsion involved in homosexual acts is of a
different kind than that involved in narcotics addiction or chronic alcoholism. Sexual preference
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We focused here on the constitutional right to privacy because it seems
to be the most fundamental constitutional value here implicated. The
clarification of this right throws light not merely on constitutional
values but on the larger question of moral values which underlie, or
should underlie, the use of the criminal law.
With respect to the decriminalization debates, this Article proposes
an analysis of moral considerations which establish that it is wholly
improper for the state to impose criminal sanctions on certain forms of
consensual conduct between adults in private. 337 Thus, we proposed
the principle of love as a civil liberty and various qualifying moral
principles which forbid the application of criminal penalties to such
conduct. These principles undoubtedly apply to other forms of consen-
sual sexual conduct and thus would justify a constitutional argument,
of the kind suggested here, invalidating the criminalization of such
conduct (for example, consensual adult heterosexual deviance or forni-
cation). However, these principles do not establish that all forms of
consensual sexual conduct between or among adults are immune from
criminal penalty.338 For example, moral principles of fidelity might
justify the existence of criminal pentlties for adultery or bigamy, at
least in some form.3 3 9 Principles of legitimate state paternalism may
raise serious arguments for anti-prostitution laws, at least in such a
form as to make wholesale constitutional invalidation an unwise
step.3 40 The moral analysis here proposed is suggestive, however, and
is not a voluntary decision. See note 245 supra. But, the decision to engage in sexual acts does not
seem compelled in the same way that forms of addiction compel. Humans can be celibate. See note
156 supra. Homosexuals can sometimes perform heterosexually. See note 322 supra. In addition,
the Robinson-Powell argument would typically assume that homosexuality is a disease. But there
is no longer any scientific consensus that it is. See note 242 supra. But for a treatment of the
eighth amendment argument which is not subject to the above objections, see Comment, The
Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 553, 567-72 (1976).
337. See Junker, Criminalization and Criminogenesis, 19 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 697 (1972).
338. See notes 132, 277, and 280 supra and accompanying text.
339. In rejecting Mill's principle in Paris, the Court cited with approval statutes making
adultery, fornication, bigamy, and prostitution illegal. 413 U.S. at 68 n. 15. Homosexuality was
not included in the list.
340. Courts in general have resisted constitutional arguments directed against prostitution
laws. See Morgan v. City of Detroit, 389 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Mich. 1975); United States v. Moses,
339 A.2d 46 (D.C. App. 1975); note 339, supra. For examples of constitutional arguments against
prostitution laws, see Prostitution: A Non-Victim Crime?, 8 Issues in Criminology 137 (1973).
Many of the arguments, adduced in support of prostitution lawvs, do not seem rationally advanced
by absolute prohibitions on prostitution. For example, the ancillary connections of prostitution to
organized crime (criminogenesis), the alleged relation to the spread of venereal disease, and the
claimed exploitation of prostitutes by pimps-all these evils would surely be more rationally
attacked by a program of licensing prostitutes, rather than by absolute prohibitions. Indeed,
many of these evils, alleged to be the reasons for absolute prohibitions of prostitution, probably
themselves result from such prohibitions (in particular, criminogenesis and pimp exploitation are
natural concomitants of criminalization, being ways in which prostitutes are protected from the
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its implications for other problems of decriminalization should be
developed in careful detail. 34 1 One general observation seems in order.
The various issues, lumped under the brocard "victimless crimes, '342
seem to be significantly different. Advocates of decriminalization
would do well, if they are to remain morally credible and forceful, to
advert more honestly to fundamental moral distinctions among the
kinds of activities they would remove from criminal penalty.
Finally, we may observe the striking felicity of the union of contrac-
tarian and constitutional theory. Contractarian theory helps explain
not only quite traditional constitutional values like free speech, 343 but
quite novel developments like the constitutional right to privacy. Law
and morals, surely, are not by definition one.3 44 But, for Americans,
the Constitution is a moral order built on substantive moral concep-
tions and ideals. Moral theory, thus, is and should be a pivotal
organon in the explanation and justification of constitutional ideas.
police). The only weighty argument, rationally related to the prohibition of prostitution, is the
idea that such prohibitions discourage the impersonal and non-emotional experience of sexuality
that commercialized prostitution typically, though not always, involves. Arguably, the state has
an interest in encouraging the experience of sexuality as part of a loving and emotional expression
of reciprocal love. If this is a legitimate state interest, prostitution, it may be argued, frustrates
it-substituting impersonal sexual release, for the kind of patient understanding and sensitivity
that reciprocal sexual love calls for; relative to this kind of model of romantic love, commer-
cialized sex is perceived as "degraded," in the sense that the higher capacities, engaged by sex
with love, are here unemployed and thus diminished. On the other hand, it may be argued that
prostitution in fact promotes emotional commitment in that it affords a safety valve for forms of
sexual experience which cannot, without danger, be satisfied in the central emotional relationship
(e.g., the desire for a kind of intercourse which the loved partner cannot or will not satisfy). Or,
at a more fundamental level, proponents of prostitution may argue that the state has no more
legitimate role in enforcing a possibly parochial model of romantic love than it does in dictating
the ways in which people will experience eating (some, for example, eat only to live, while others
live to eat). On this view, there is a wide range of functions that sexuality serves in human life;
love is one, procreation is another, recreation yet a third. The state has no proper role or even
right to frustrate human autonomy in deciding in what form mature people choose to experience
sexuality.
Arguably, these arguments are so complex and difficult to unravel, and the form of remedy so
difficult to design (for example, the substitution of licensing for prohibitions) that courts are not
the proper forum to consider the issue. On the other hand, perhaps courts could deal with this
problem in the same way they have been able to cope with the complexities of school financing.
See Equal Opportunity, supra note 4, at 64-70.
341. Several courts have cited the constitutional right to privacy as encompassing the right to
die. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C. 2d 619,
623 (C.P. Northampton County Ct. 1973). See Note, Is There a Right to a Natural Death?, 9
New Eng. L. Rev. 293 (1974); Note, The Dying Patient: A Qualified Right to Refuse Medical
Treatment, 7 J. Fain. Law 644 (1967).
342. See, e.g., E. Schur and H. Bedau, Victimless Crimes (1974); E. Schur, Crimes Without
Victims (1965).
343. See Free Speech, supra note 5.
344. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593
(1958).
